The Basque terrorist group Eta has announced that it will no longer target elected politicians. The idea that it is legitimate to kill some people, and not others, is naturally abhorrent to democrats, but the move does give some grounds for guarded optimism. The Spanish government publicly rejected Eta's statement as falling far short of the total ceasefire required as a condition of the recent offer by the prime minister, Mr Zapatero, to engage in any dialogue with the organisation.
This is a tougher pre-condition than the Irish and British governments imposed on the IRA in the run-up to their total ceasefire in 1994, though what is happening behind the scenes may not be that different. The Reynolds government used third parties to convince Sinn Féin of the benefits of a total ceasefire and an exclusively political strategy. Yet, Madrid's private view of Eta's declaration seems positive. "Despite its insufficiency, this is a step towards peace," a government source has told El País newspaper.
There is no doubt that Eta is now at a very weak point in logistical terms. Political support for terrorism in the Basque country has shrunk since the group ended its 1998/99 truce. The banning of Batasuna, the party alleged to be Eta's Sinn Féin, or political wing, has taken its toll.
However, the strong performance of a surrogate party, the Communist Party of the Basque Lands (EHAK), in last April's Basque elections, suggests that Eta's aspiration to Basque independence, and some form of socialism, is still widely shared in the region. It is an open secret that many EHAK voters believe that a ceasefire will advance such aims.
Eta now appears to be offering a ceasefire by instalments. It may be seeking to gain the maximum political benefit from a drawn-out process. This would give the deceptive appearance of negotiations from a position of strength, even if no formal talks are actually taking place. It may well be that Eta is divided, with some leaders against any farewell to arms. Theoretically, Eta still regards the security forces, and even academics and journalists, as targets. But further killings would destroy the current chances of a resolution to the Basque conflict.
Eta's waiting game risks squandering a unique circumstance. Mr Zapatero appears more open to a fundamental restructuring of the Spanish state than any of his predecessors. But his popularity may already have peaked. And even his highly qualified offer of dialogue with Eta has mobilised massive opposition from the Spanish right, and some strong criticism in his own ranks. Eta should recognise this and call a total ceasefire.