Behind the confusing news about the fighting for control of the southern city of Najaf there exists a relentless battle for political control of Iraq. The rebel forces led by the radical but junior Shia cleric, Mr Moqtada al-Sadr, rejected reports that they have surrendered control of the city's holy shrine to state troops or police and the US troops supporting them. Instead, they said, the keys have been handed over to the most senior Shia cleric, Grand Ali Ayatollah al-Sistani.
His entry into the conflict, even as a mediator, reveals much about the forces involved. For the interim Iraqi government led by Mr Iyad Allawi this battle must be won to establish its political credibility and control. The Shia leaders must ensure they have a central role in governing Iraq after elections planned for next year, even though they are politically divided among themselves. For the US-led troops in Iraq it is another stage in their effort to establish a plausible successor regime behind which they will continue to assert political control.
Many Iraqis rank security, employment, restored public services and democratic involvement in the country's future as their main political priorities - and in that order. So far the interim government, which was largely nominated by the US administration and was then endorsed by a weakened United Nations authority, has comprehensively failed to provide them. Iraqis in Najaf and other cities complain their lives are hell and want to escape. They are divided in their political loyalties between many different currents, only some of which are adequately represented in the political conference which set out the terms of negotiation with Mr al-Sadr this week. There is a great fear that the country could break up in civil war, even in territorial secession, if progress is not made. There is an abiding and deep desire to see a US withdrawal from the country.
Mr Allawi's decision to attack Mr al-Sadr's military and political bases in Najaf and Baghdad is widely blamed within Iraq and the Arab world on the US. In Najaf control of the holiest Shia shrine makes it an extraordinarily sensitive matter, which cannot be dictated by any US demand for military victory.
It is significant that the political conference's conditions put to Mr al-Sadr are less demanding than those of Mr Allawi. They call on him to dissolve his militia, vacate the shrine and join the political process they are embarked upon. Mr Allawi calls for a surrender in an ultimatum without a deadline. It would indeed be a breakthough if Mr al-Sadr's forces were to become involved in the political process; but this may not prove acceptable to Mr Allawi or to the US.
Political progress is possible if US control is relaxed in favour of a demonstrable Iraqi authority and a convincing assertion of political engagement. The complexity and fluidity of Iraqi politics must be recognised by all concerned. Volatile world oil prices are a vivid and compelling demonstration of this political uncertainty.