The political chaos in London has now created a zombie prime minister to go along with a zombie Brexit, a dead project that carries on in its own brainlessly destructive way. At this low point for British politics, it is almost impossible to remember a startling fact: this is the easy bit. The cacophonous discord created by the withdrawal agreement is just the overture to the mad opera of Brexit. Unless the UK gets itself out of this mess now, it will be set for at least a decade of conflict, uncertainty and instability.
Even if Theresa May somehow manages to force her deal through by delaying it until the only other option is a catastrophic no-deal departure on March 29th, 2019, the tribulations will not be over. That highly unlikely achievement would not be the beginning of the end. It would be merely the end of the beginning. What would follow would be a world of trouble.
This has been the easy bit because the withdrawal agreement had to deal with just three things, helpfully summarised by Michel Barnier at the start of the process: people, money, Ireland. People means the mutual rights of EU and UK citizens currently living in each other's territories. There was always going to be a deal precisely because the needs are mutual. Money meant the divorce bill that the UK would have to pay to meet the commitments it has made to the EU budget. It is an emotive question and there was some ridiculous shape-throwing from the likes of Boris ("go whistle") Johnson. But, in the end, it's just money – a figure was not that difficult to agree.
Evil Irish plot
And that left, of course, the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone. In effect, the British had, in this phase of Brexit, one job to do: come up with a way to live up to its own guarantees that, whatever happens, there will be no reimposition of a physical infrastructure on the Border. It is important to bear in mind that these guarantees were not – as is now being widely suggested – forced on the British as part of an evil Irish plot to trap them in bondage to the EU.
Theresa May’s own words, in her speech in Florence in September 2017, were: “We will not accept any physical infrastructure at the Border.” It was Britain, not just Ireland and not just the EU, that insisted a way had to be found to avoid in all circumstances this unacceptable outcome.
It failed to do this, even after it agreed to the now-notorious backstop in December 2017. The all-party House of Commons committee on Brexit summed things up in its latest report, issued last weekend: “In December 2017, we said that we did not see how it would be possible to reconcile maintaining an open Border on the island of Ireland with leaving the single market and customs union, which would inevitably make the Northern Irish Border the UK’s customs and regulatory border with the European Union. Since then, we have seen no realistic, long-term proposals from the Government that would address this.”
May’s government had one job to do and it didn’t do it. That failure meant that the withdrawal agreement had to create a default in which the UK remains in a customs union with the EU and Northern Ireland remains effectively tied to the single market too.
Damnably difficult
Hence, as we’ve seen, all the Mayhem. The Border question is admittedly a damnably difficult one, but the fact is that this one thing alone has led to the open collapse of political authority in the UK. So how, then, will Britain deal with the huge array of difficult questions that will arise if the Brexit show somehow stays on the road? For there can be no illusion that if only May can pull off the near impossible trick of getting a withdrawal deal through parliament in January, all the rest of the way will be clear.
Once those negotiations start, the British may become nostalgic for the days when there was only the Irish backstop to give them migraines
Consider the issue that, for May herself, is the single defining purpose of Brexit: control of immigration. She believes – and Jeremy Corbyn is in uncomfortable agreement with her on this – that ending freedom of movement is what Leave voters most desire and that if it is delivered, all the pain of Brexit will be justified. So where is the British government’s post-Brexit immigration policy?
On October 17th, 2017, the then home secretary, Amber Rudd, told the home affairs committee at Westminster: "We have our White Paper coming out on immigration by the end of the year [ie 2017]." On March 28th, 2018, Rudd told the same committee: "We have decided to wait until the migration advisory committee reports in its entirety in September this year to go forward with the policy and the White Paper after that." On July 10th, 2018, the current home secretary, Sajid Javid, told the committee: "The timeframe that we set out… is a White Paper in the autumn followed by an immigration Bill early next year." On December 2nd, 2018, Javid told the BBC, "it's very unlikely to be published before the vote" on the withdrawal treaty.
Simplistic promises
Could it be that the White Paper on immigration has not been published because the simplistic promises that were made as part of the pitch for Brexit cannot be fulfilled? It is extremely difficult to reconcile the needs of businesses and the NHS, the desire of non-European ethnic communities for more immigration from their countries of origin and the expectation of many Leave voters that immigration would simply cease after Brexit. As rhetoric meets reality, tensions will surely rise.
But the biggest problems will come if and when the British and the EU start to negotiate their future relationship. They have a political declaration but it is much thinner than anyone expected it to be even a year ago. Once those negotiations start, the British may become nostalgic for the good old days when there was only the Irish backstop to give them migraines.
Instead of one big issue, they will have to deal with trade in goods and services; foreign policy, security and policing co-ordination; participation in EU agencies; agriculture; fisheries; data protection; labour mobility and the mutual recognition of professional qualifications; broadcasting; intellectual property; public procurement; consumer safety and standards; aviation; freight; energy; medicines; and scientific co-operation. And instead of dealing with the EU 27 as a bloc, they will have to face 27 countries, each with a veto and each with its own particular interests to defend. All of his – bear in mind – while also trying to construct a trade deal with, for example, Donald Trump.
Extension
And by July 2020, Britain will have to decide whether it wishes to ask for an extension of the transition period or accept the implementation of the backstop. The first will involve more payments to the EU and a longer period of rule-taking – cue explosions of outrage. The second is already imprinted in political consciousness as a disaster. So more political chaos. And in principle this could be repeated annually as the same choice returns until a final settlement is reached.
This, remember, is the benign scenario, in which the withdrawal agreement somehow passes through Westminster. The alternative – no deal – is much, much worse. Brexit is not leading Britain through the current political desert to a land of milk and honey, but through one desert into another. The only rational course of action is to stop the caravan while there is still time.