The crash of Germanwings Flight 9525 in the French Alps on Tuesday, in which 150 people died, raises serious questions not only about the specific mental state of co-pilot Andreas Lubitz who was flying the plane, but also generally about the type of training pilots receive, the safeguards in place and the efficacy of aircraft security measures.
When I learned to fly back in the mid 1960s aircraft systems were a lot more rudimentary. The older systems were referred to good-humouredly as “iron dial” as opposed to the latest models being cathode ray tube, now LED. I did my flying training on the top of a hill in Perth in Scotland courtesy of Aer Lingus and learnt to deal with very poor weather conditions from the very beginning. Modern flying schools are based in areas where there is a lot of very favourable flying weather and the necessary hours experience can be clocked up in a short time.
I then made a giant leap to a four-engine turboprop called a Viscount, and spent about 20 hours flying the real aircraft around the circuit, with an instructor, half the time with one of the engines having failed. If one made a mistake that the instructor could not pick up in time, there could have been a real disaster. There was one such accident, killing the instructor and two young cadet pilots. However, in a crash in a modern simulator you get out of the simulator, have a cup of coffee and try again until you get it right or fail the course. The stress levels are lower in a simulator and a lot of training for recovery from severe upsets cannot be realistically carried out using these devices.
There was also about four months of ground school where you learnt about the aircraft systems and understood the operation of them all. The teachers were all active engineers and mechanics in Aer Lingus and were well able to teach because they knew the material themselves in great theoretical and practical detail.
All this training encouraged, dare I say it, a love for the aircraft and certainly one would never even dream of damaging it or its occupants.
Most air accidents in the old days were due to engineering shortcomings in the design and maintenance of aircraft. Nowadays accidents are more likely to happen because of mistakes or deliberate rogue action by pilots.
Systems are mostly automated now and pilots are encouraged to utilise these systems, letting the autopilot do the flying, even the landing. Problems, when they occur, can be handled with check lists which come up on screens. Of course there are multiple systems, electrics, hydraulics, air conditioning, pressurisation, fuel and about 17 other things to be monitored. To understand them all in detail would take many years of study and neither pilots nor airlines have the time or the money to fund this activity. Pilots are a bit like GPs, they have an overall understanding of the aircraft. Unfortunately, the equivalent of the specialist is not there on the spot and things happen very quickly when aircraft system malfunctions.
However, pilots become very dependent on automated systems and when problems do occur they are more inclined to try and fix the faulty computer than attend immediately to the system failure, this is the control, alt, delete of the cockpit.
Cockpit
The aviation world changed on September 11th, 2001. Security became more important than any other consideration and cockpit doors were reinforced. These doors were constructed so as to withstand small arms fire and even hand grenades. However, there was an unintended consequence, a person in the cockpit could prevent anyone entering the cockpit, including – as happened this week – the other pilot.
There are a number of other crashes where it is believed that one pilot was most likely locked out and the aircraft deliberately flown into the ground or water at high speed by the pilot remaining in the cockpit. This probably occurred in the case of Malaysian MH370 last March which lost all contact with the outside world and seemingly crashed somewhere in the south Indian Ocean. Similar events are likely to have occurred in the following incidents:
* SilkAir Flight 185 was a scheduled passenger flight from Jakarta, Indonesia, to Singapore, which crashed into the Musi River near Palembang in southern Sumatra, Indonesia, on December 19th, 1997, killing all 97 passengers and seven crew members. The United States’ National Transportation Safety Board made a conclusion from its interpretation of the absent flight data recorder data that the crash was the result of deliberate flight control inputs, most likely by the captain.
* LAM Flight 470 entered a rapid descent while en route between Maputo and Luanda on November 29th, 2013, and crashed in Namibia. Preliminary investigation results indicate that the accident was intentional. The captain made control inputs that directed the plane to the ground, shortly after the first officer had left the flight deck. Thirty-three people died.
* Egypt Air Flight 990, a Boeing 767, entered a rapid descent some 30 minutes after departure from New York-JFK Airport on October 31st, 1999. This happened moments after the captain had left the flight deck. During the investigation it was suggested that the accident was caused by a deliberate act by the relief first officer. However, there was no conclusive evidence. The NTSB concluded that the accident was a “result of the relief first officer’s flight control inputs. The reason for the relief first officer’s actions was not determined.” The suggestions of a deliberate act were heavily disputed by Egyptian authorities. Two hundred and seventeen people died.
Security
Pilots are searched getting on to aircraft just like passengers. If a pilot wants to hijack an aircraft he does not need any weapon. Accidents caused by pilots cannot be eliminated, but perhaps the probability of having a rogue pilot can be lessened by making sure that those selected to carry out the responsibilities have, in addition to good health and indications that the candidate has potential ability to fly an aircraft, evidence of a stable personality, self-discipline, good judgment, leadership qualities and command potential. The battery of tests carried out in the selection of pilots is indeed daunting.
Perhaps no other profession is so tightly regulated in terms of ongoing medical and operational checking and monitoring. Even back in the 1960s, there were a lot of intelligence and aptitude tests and an hour long visit with a psychologist. I remember one thing they were looking for was the absence of “magical thinking”. I was lucky to be sponsored by Aer Lingus. Nowadays it’s said that pilots are self-selecting. If you or your parents have enough money you can go off to a flying school and get the required qualifications and experience. You get your pilot’s licence and look for a job. In some airlines, particularly if you are looked on as a good candidate, psychological screening may be minimal.
Although not from an aeronautical medical background, I do think those in this area should re-evaluate the certification criteria of pilots who suffer from illnesses which are likely to recur. The cockpit of an airliner is no place for political correctness. The person best to judge if a pilot is fit to sit in the cockpit of one of his aircraft is, from his knowledge, the flight operations manager or chief pilot. Wrongful dismissal is a big issue these days, but a minor injustice is better than a major catastrophe. Despite all the psychological and psychiatric tests, you can never eliminate the selection of a person who turns out to be a rogue, there must be some rogues in all professions.
Fintan Ryan is a Chartered Engineer, FRAeS, and retired Aer Lingus Senior Captain, who does consultancy work