Some suspect that the current crisis has been generated to galvanise support for the Pakistani regime, writes Tom Clonan
An examination of the rising tension between India and Pakistan provides an alarming insight into the dynamics of militarism and religious and nationalist fundamentalism.
Military analysts concur that in the event of a conventional war, India would have the upper hand by sheer weight of numbers and material. In the event of a nuclear war, it is likely that the outcome would ultimately favour India, but at an unimaginable humanitarian and environmental cost.
No matter what form of warfare prosecuted, the final analysis is one of a zero-sum outcome for Pakistan. What logic, therefore, could sustain the prospect of such an unevenly matched contest? The reason for Pakistan's current military posture lies perhaps not in the external affairs of Kashmir, but in the internal dynamic of Pakistani politics.
Gen Pervez Musharraf is the head of a theocratic state governed by virtual military dictatorship. He heads an elite grouping in Pakistan that combines shrewd political acumen and force of arms to mobilise power.
Historically, as Pakistan has developed as an emerging regional power, rapid economic and cultural change have rendered the grip on power of successive regimes tenuous at best.
Musharraf, like many leaders before him, has therefore engaged the twin discourses of Islam and Pakistani nationalism to coalesce and maintain support for his regime.
These twin discourses have generated an environment within which the Pakistani military and its Inter Services Intelligence Agency have been permitted to arm and equip Islamic fundamentalists. This occurred in neighbouring Afghanistan and more recently, it is alleged, in Jammu and Kashmir.
It is ironic to note in the context of the US's current war on terrorism that Pakistan was assisted in the arming of Afghan Mujahadeen by the United States during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s.
This campaign satisfied the foreign and domestic policy aims of both Pakistan and the US.
Unfortunately, the war in Afghanistan led to an influx of over three million Afghan refugees into Pakistan. Growing instability in Afghanistan after the collapse of the Soviet-installed puppet regime complicated this threat to internal Pakistani stability. The Pakistani military was forced to act, and the Pandora's box of armed Islamic fundamentalism, opened by the United States, ultimately gave rise to the Taliban. The rest, as they say, is history.
India, a secular democracy with over 150 million Muslims among its population, is a reluctant participant in the present crisis. Many Indians feel that the current brinkmanship is designed to maintain Musharraf's hold on power domestically and to pressurise the West into providing aid and investment for Pakistan. This would be achieved by keeping Central Asia and Pakistan high on the US agenda.
THE current crisis in Kashmir, brought to a head by recent events, has certainly satisfied this requirement. By accident or design, the crisis has served to restore morale within the Pakistani military and has galvanised support for President Musharraf's regime within Pakistan. With the apparent failure of diplomatic moves on the part of India and Pakistan to solve the crisis - aside from a potentially calamitous military option - the best hope for the region lies in international aid and investment for what is undeniably one of Asia's potential economic powerhouses.
In return, Pakistan would very likely ease its pressure over the Kashmir issue. The world might be spared a nuclear war in the region and economic prosperity would be renewed and accelerated in Pakistan.
Such an outcome would certainly enhance Pakistan's chances of graduating once more from military dictatorship to democracy. The alternative is unthinkable.
Tom Clonan is a retired army captain who lectures in the political economy of communications in the Institute of Technology in Tallaght