There are problems ahead. Just because the Belfast Agreement was endorsed by 84 per cent of the people of the island does not guarantee progression towards reconciliation and peace. And the reason is that support among the unionist community in Northern Ireland has been bought at a price which may yet prove too much to pay.
During the course of the campaign on the agreement, David Trimble claimed repeatedly that Sinn Fein could not take part in the new Northern Ireland executive until the IRA started to decommission its weapons.
Tony Blair initially supported this position, although he later tried to fudge it. But he too conveyed to the unionist electors that IRA arms decommissioning was a precondition of Sinn Fein participation in the executive.
Both he and David Trimble said that such a precondition would be built into the Westminster legislation establishing the new institutions under the agreement. If the legislation were to contain such a precondition it would be in conflict with the agreement.
The agreement makes it clear that the only precondition attaching to membership of the executive that would be required of Sinn Fein is adherence to the principles of the agreement which, arguably, include a commitment to decommissioning.
However, as Gerry Adams has made clear, Sinn Fein has no difficulty about committing itself to decommissioning, but that has nothing to do with the IRA.
When it emerges that the legislation setting up the new institutions contains no precondition on decommissioning, where will that leave David Trimble? Even if the issue is fudged at the legislative stage, and in the lead-up to the assembly elections on June 25th, shortly thereafter the fudge will become untenable. The effect will be to cause a loss of nerve among even pro-agreement unionists.
The problem is that the unionist population has not been conditioned to the inevitable consequences of the settlement. This contrasts markedly with what happened in the nationalist community throughout the island of Ireland. Nationalists have long since accepted that, for instance, Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution had to go and that the very basis of nationalism - that the people of Ireland as a whole had the right to national self-determination - had to be abandoned.
It was therefore no surprise that there was such overwhelming support among nationalists for the agreement (about 96 per cent). The unionists' position is even worse than not being conditioned to accommodate the settlement. Events have made them more opposed to the settlement than they might otherwise have been. A series of manoeuvres has created understandable anxieties among them that their interests are being secretly compromised.
On October 22nd, 1993, the then Northern Ireland secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew, said in the House of Commons: "Sinn Fein must end the violence and demonstrate its commitment to democratic constitutional politics . . . and until then, there should be no doubt that the government will not conduct talks and negotiations with anyone who perpetrates, threatens or supports the use of violence for political ends."
Three days later, following the Shankill bomb on October 23rd, 1993, Sir Patrick again told the House of Commons: "It must be understood that there will never be any bargaining with those who in this democracy are being forced in arguments with bombs and bullets or the threat of violence."
On November 1st, 1993, the then prime minister, John Major, said "We are dealing with people who are beyond the pale of civilised behaviour, and it does not lie within the remit of any honourable member to be able to talk them out of their behaviour."
Responding to a suggestion that he should deal with the IRA, Mr Major said: "If the implication of [these] remarks is that we should sit down and talk with Mr Adams and the Provisional IRA, I can only say that that would turn my stomach and those of most honourable members. We will not do it."
On November 28th, 1993, the Observer revealed that the British government and Sinn Fein and/or the IRA had been holding secret talks since the previous February. When, on the following day, Ian Paisley described Sir Patrick's previous statements as `falsehoods' and then refused to withdraw his remark, he was required to leave the House of Commons.
This episode must have had a deeply traumatic effect on the minds of unionists and must have persuaded them that any concession at all was a cover for something on a far grander scale.
The process of fudge over decommissioning right from the beginning of the talks must have been disquieting as well. There was the initial insistence that the IRA would have to decommission before Sinn Fein would be permitted to enter talks, then that decommissioning would have to take place during the course of the talks, and finally that decommissioning would have to be a part of a final settlement. Every one of these demands was abandoned, first by the British and then by David Trimble.
Irrespective of the significance (or lack of it) of the decommissioning issue itself, the fact that positions taken were progressively abandoned has had a very damaging impact.
The situation is now made even worse. Throughout the campaign on the agreement, David Trimble repeatedly lambasted Sinn Fein.
An advertisement on behalf of the Ulster Unionist Party in the News Letter stated: "Republicans want to provoke Unionism to reject the Stormont agreement. Their fascist-style antics at their Dublin conference were their most recent attempt. They want Unionists to fall into the trap of isolating ourselves and being vilified around the world as the people who said `No'. The UUP, by staying in the talks, thwarted their efforts. Do not allow Republicans to succeed at the ballot box having failed through the Armalite."
Perhaps clever in the short term, but ultimately greatly problematic.
How now will it be possible for David Trimble to join with Sinn Fein in the executive in a few months' time? More than that, how will it be possible for those pro-agreement unionists elected to the assembly on the basis of such antagonism to Sinn Fein be able to tolerate Sinn Fein joining that executive?
Even if this problem is resolved, how can we expect the unionist members of the new assembly to go along with the changes in the police force, the release of prisoners and the establishment of North-South bodies given that their electorate has never been prepared for such concessions?
Ultimately political change can come about only if the electorate is persuaded to change. This has not happened with the unionist community and it is difficult to see any agreement working on the basis of that.