The semi-State sector in Ireland used to constitute what the British Labour Party once described as "the commanding heights of the economy".
The conservatism of the business class inherited at independence forced the State to act as entrepreneur, if it wanted natural resources exploited and the basic infrastructure of a modern economy.
Some very successful companies were created, which also gave much-needed employment at one time, including the ESB, Bord na Móna, Irish Shipping, the Sugar Company, the air transport companies, and RTÉ. As late as 1980, State companies were looked to by Government to expand their workforce to absorb rising unemployment.
Till the mid-1980s, there were keen ideological arguments on the merits of private and State enterprise, with a minimalist National Development Corporation representing the political compromise. Local radio was delayed by arguments over ownership.
For a period, there was two-way traffic. The State exited from Irish Life, the B&I shipping company and Irish Shipping. "Shooting white elephants" was what business and media cheerleaders prescribed for semi-State loss-makers like NÉT and Irish Steel. Yet the State picked up the Whitegate oil refinery, and was reluctantly forced to nationalise the grossly inefficient Dublin Gas Company (Frank Cluskey was right about that, though he paid for his conviction by ministerial resignation). The aircraft maintenance operation Team Aer Lingus virtually ended large State ventures. The Labour Party's failure to pursue in office post-1992 the third banking force, terminated the last serious initiative to expand the semi-State sector, where employment is about 56,000.
Mrs Thatcher gave privatisation a bad name. Despite the advent of the PDs, Government moves in that direction have been cautious, with Greencore, the State banks ICC and ACC, Irish Steel and Eircom being the main examples, with Aer Lingus and the Great Southern Hotels in the offing. Even companies remaining in State ownership are more exposed to competition, as required by EU rules. Liberalisation of air transport was a huge success. Some recent experiences have been unsettling. When Greencore was privatised, it was not about encouraging competition, but whether the State should be involved in sugar production.
Did anyone imagine that sugar production would, within 15 years, be bought out by the EU, and cease altogether in Ireland, alone among EU countries, and a profitable tillage sector closed down? Could the outcome have been different, if Irish Sugar had remained in public ownership? It is no use expecting a private company to consider anything but shareholders' interests. It is to be hoped that the wrangles over handsome compensation negotiated by Minster for Agriculture Mary Coughlan will not result in a large share of it going, not to farmers, workers, or Greencore, but to lawyers.
The Irish Steel and Eircom sagas are not much more reassuring. Irish Steel, like IFI, into which heavy State investment was poured, was sold and within a few years closed down, leaving a heavily polluted Haulbowline. IFI fertiliser production made viable by subsidised gas also ceased.
The second mobile phone licence was sold for a pittance, created vast windfall fortunes, rapidly cashed in on by its purchasers, and in some cases removed from the tax jurisdiction. A tribunal is still sitting years on investigating the circumstances.
Many commercial cases illustrate that our legal system is perfect for protecting the rights of parties with deep pockets, operating on the principle that Dickens's interminable Jarndyce v Jarndyce is an infinitely preferable model to Henry VII's Star Chamber.
Privatisation of the State telecommunications monopoly, admittedly for a substantial sum to the Exchequer, has left the Government with few levers to propel the spread of broadband, despite its being a strategic need.
Such episodes have made politicians and public servants very cautious, and more inclined than ever to bring in consultants at substantial public expense, who are not always good value for money, to spread the responsibility of making difficult but important choices. The trade union solution of leaving everything open to a State holding company at arms length has no attraction for Ministers, who would then combine accountability with political impotence.
Experience shows the need to think through worst-case scenarios. In the case of the Great Southern Hotels, there are almost none. Part-privatisation of Aer Lingus to gain investment but not to abandon all control seems the safest option for now. The break-up of Aer Rianta has not yet given Shannon and Cork full commercial freedom, with the debt share-out unresolved. The State may yet have to give them a free sheet.
As for competition and the break-up of monopolies, the case is not always made in the interests of lower prices for consumers, but can simply be a demand for a slice of a profitable State-baked cake. Having to remunerate shareholders is not necessarily superior to efficient public service provision. Does more competition in the energy sector mean prices having to rise rather than fall? The robust French defence of public enterprise is an alternative not to be dismissed.
Rail safety and the supply of quality drinking water are best kept to a publicly accountable authority. If Irish Rail insists on closing down freight, one can only look forward to the advent of private operators, if necessary with some State support, because of the social and environmental benefits. Provision of full-day bus and social transport services cannot reliably be left to the market.
State companies like An Post should not be put in financial difficulties through regulators withholding reasonable price rises. If there is a backlog in driver testing, what exactly is wrong with more testers, especially as the test fees presumably cover most, if not all, of the cost of employing them?
The semi-State sector is no longer a leading branch of the economy, but it still occupies a strategic position. Decisions about its future still matter.