WORLD VIEW:IRELAND IS deeply entangled with Europe historically, politically and culturally but the Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign reveals substantial popular unease about where the relationship with the European Union is destined to go, writes Paul Gillespie.
It is as much about us as them - indeed, with this decision, we can shape the emerging system as well as being shaped by it.
But such a mutuality is put at risk by differing perceptions about the relationship among political elites and ordinary voters. The gap between them revealed by the campaign opens up rare opportunities for those on the No side - most of them unelected - to find political voice and influence. They have seized it with skill and alacrity by spreading a mixture of alternative interpretations and implications as well as confusing or false views on the treaty's contents.
They captured the main ground of debate successfully, setting an agenda with which the Yes side has had difficulty catching up. Until recent days, the Yes side has not articulated a positive, non-threatening account of how the treaty equips the EU to play a more effective and constructive role in a more multipolar and competitive world, despite its undeniable imperfections.
Now that the EU has made the transition from a mainly economic to a much more political entity, it has a greater impact on everyday life. But this is not adequately reflected in the political and media arenas of most EU member states, where its affairs are corralled off from domestic issues. As a result, levels of popular knowledge about and engagement with the EU remain low, creating problems when political elites and leaders require approval for new projects.
In this exam season, the distinction between cramming and learning springs to mind as voters are asked whether to say Yes or No to Lisbon, with little or no recall of the lessons learned during previous EU referendums. Levels of self-perceived knowledge have improved during the campaign, but most people remain only vaguely aware of the issues or do not know what the treaty is about, according to the latest Irish Times/TNS mrbi poll. Those with most knowledge are more likely to vote Yes, but there has also been a definite swing among them towards the No side. The closing days of the campaign will tell whether further swings occur as both sides respond.
It could be like the shock which defeat of the first Nice referendum delivered to the political establishment in 2001. But the main difference between Nice 1 and Nice 2 was in the levels of turnout on the Yes side, which nearly doubled in size, whereas the No side remained static. It is difficult to predict the turnout from this poll, but it seems clear the No side will attract more support than in 2001/2, requiring a higher turnout by Yes voters if they are to win. This would bring overall turnout to the 50 per cent mark in a photo finish - unless a much higher level occurs, reflecting a more successful, but variegated, No campaign.
That uncertainty about turnout is compounded by another distinctive aspect of this contest, the failure of party leaderships to direct party loyalists in support of the treaty. Fine Gael and Labour voters are respectively divided 40/30 and 47/30 against it. This reflects a wider dilution of party loyalties, as revealed in just-published study The Irish Voter, showing that voters feel less close to their parties than before and suggesting that parties will find it harder to win the trust of voters on issues like Lisbon.
These two disconnects, between political elites and popular opinion and between party leaderships and voters, have been fully in play during the campaign. The gaps have been filled by civil society involvement more on the No than the Yes side, in contrast to the Nice 2 campaign. This reflects the deliberate EU-wide demobilisation of political engagement following the 2005 French and Dutch referendums on the constitutional treaty, when political leaders reverted to intergovernmental diplomacy and eschewed communicative visions of Europe's role.
The resulting political vacuum has affected Ireland's debate on Lisbon. We are the only state to hold a referendum on it - other governments retreated in fear of a populist, nationalist or left-wing backlash (or because of legal opinions that Lisbon changes sovereignty too little to require a referendum). Those ingredients are present on the No side, but that does not explain its specific momentum, which also has a genuine democratic component. Despite the misconceptions and distortions complained of by politicians who favour the treaty, the campaign has revived a raw-edged public debate on the purposes of integration.
Unfortunately, the EU political system is ill-placed to cater for an Irish No. Lisbon is the Plan B. There is little scope or appetite for a collective renegotiation and, precisely because of the variegated No campaign, great difficulty in identifying specific items to satisfy Ireland.
Realistically, therefore, the choice for wavering or undecided voters is between a No vote which would isolate or marginalise Ireland and the better course - a Yes vote that would allow this greater public awareness of EU integration to be channelled into future politicisation of these issues.
That can come, first through the increased muscle a Yes vote would give the Government within the EU system; and second, from a more effective use of the opportunities Lisbon opens up for national parliaments and the European Parliament to represent and channel public opinion. Next year's European Parliament elections could begin that process, using stronger political parties and cross-national links between different political currents among the member states.
...