Political grandstanding is distracting from efforts to solve the environmental mess caused by BP oil leak, writes TONY ALLWRIGHT
UNDOUBTEDLY THE uncontrolled blowout of oil and gas from the 5,500m-deep Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico, while being drilled by BP in 1,522m of water, is among the worst disasters in the history of the hydrocarbon industry. Only very dedicated and skilful human ingenuity and engineering grunt, without regard to cost, will bring it back under control and make it permanently safe.
But, despite what “experts” such as White House energy adviser Carol Browner and her boss have told us, it is certainly not the worst such catastrophe, at least not yet. Eleven men were killed – a never-ending tragedy for each of their families. But when the North Sea’s Piper Alpha platformexploded (twice) in 1988, the death toll was 167.
We are similarly misinformed that Macondo represents America's worst environmental disaster, worse even than the Exxon Valdezcalamity in 1989, which spilled 250,000 barrels of heavy viscous crude into the sea. But no one knows the Macondo flow rate because there is no way to measure it. Every figure being bandied about, from 2,000 to 80,000 barrels per day or more, is based on nothing other than humans eyeballing the flow as depicted by underwater TV cameras.
In any case what is relevant is the environmental damage. The Exxon Valdezran aground and spewed its treacly load just 4km (2.4 miles) from Bligh Island and 15km from the Alaskan mainland, so all the wildlife and beaches were instantly devastated. By contrast, Macondo is 80km offshore and its crude is lighter and more volatile. Much of it is simply evaporating in the balmy Gulf of Mexico weather, being biodegraded by wave action and spreading out thinly as it makes its leisurely way towards land or further out to sea. That is, the oil that has escaped BP's clever ruse of applying dispersant at the seabed.
On top of that, BP has contracted an armada, largely from local fishing fleets, of 1,400 vessels and 20,000 people to boom and skim and scoop the oil to keep it from the coastline. Consequently, our TV screens are not depicting the mile upon mile of blackened beaches and tens of thousands of oil-covered birds and animals that were such a shocking feature of the Valdez calamity.
As for the total amount of oil flowing into the Gulf of Mexico, Macondo is a long way from the record of the Ixtoc blowout of 1979 in which 3.3 million barrels of oil leaked for nine months despoiling some 260km of mainly Texas coastline, and killing up to 80 per cent of marine life. It is instructive, however, that thanks to rigorous clean-up and nature’s own recovery mechanisms, neither the Valdez nor Ixtoc caused lasting damage to the environment. Likewise, we can be sure BP is big and rich enough to fulfil its promise to make good all its mess, eventually.
Just as public figures have failed to put perspective on the Macondo blowout, they have displayed similar ignorance concerning the extraordinary technological efforts BP has been applying in reducing the flow until such time as the two relief wells reach their target.
The company has had up to 20 surface ships in close proximity, each held in position by satellite-centred dynamic positioning. In the cold, pressurised, lightless, hostile environment 1,522m underwater, BP has been using some 14 unmanned submarines to conduct a series of intricate manoeuvres such as shoving, tugging, manipulating, cutting, grinding, positioning, connecting, observing.
But because few understand the engineering and it cannot be seen, interest in this astounding activity is scant. BP has systematically been applying one imaginative potential solution after another, each one carefully thought through with failures and back-ups factored in. No organisation could be tackling this massive challenge more professionally than BP and every attempt to distract it reduces its chances of success.
Nevertheless, BP’s approach to the problem it has created does stand in stark contrast to the events leading up to it, which indeed are highly questionable. A lot of evidence suggest disgraceful, last-minute, cost-reducing short cuts. A couple of weeks ago, the day after the US administration subjected BP chief executive Tony Hayward and the company to a $20 billion (€16 million) “shakedown” (Congressman Joe Barton’s word), Hayward appeared before a congressional committee to be grilled on prime-time TV, ostensibly about these events.
Some days earlier, the committee had sent him a 14-page letter detailing five technical areas where BP had arguably cut corners. It was superbly crafted, meticulous, leaving very little wriggle-room for Hayward. Yet when it came to the hearing, the search for the truth of what caused the blowout was overwhelmed by committee members’ overweening desire to demonstrate their toughness.
Once the real questioning began, the aggressive tone continued, yet the questions singularly failed to delve into the acute technical issues so adeptly exposed in the letter. In turn this allowed Hayward to repeat his mantra that BP was still investigating; he wasn’t a technical expert; action would be taken – and other evasions.
You would think that not just for BP, but for the US administration and the general public, the most important issue right now is to kill that damn well, make it permanently safe and clean up any damage.
Yet the US administration seems to apportion greater priority not to winning this gargantuan battle against nature but to launching inquiries, belligerent “kick-ass” blather and criminal investigations. This is the behaviour of ignorance. Once Macondo is solved – and it will be – there will be decades for anger, recrimination, lawsuits, inquiries, compensation, prison terms, sanctions or whatever. The future is a long time.
Meantime, ignorance seems to hold sway.
Tony Allwright is an engineering consultant with a background in the oil and gas industry