The Bush administration's counter-terror experts and agencies have concluded that the war in Iraq has made the problem worse, not better. This is an edited part of the US National Intelligence Estimate, headed 'Key Judgments'
United States-led counter-terrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of al-Qaeda and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qaeda will continue to pose the greatest threat to the homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organisation.
We also assess that the global jihadist movement - which includes al-Qaeda, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells - is spreading and adapting to counter-terrorism efforts.
Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.
If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.
Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit.
Over time, such progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qaeda, could erode support for the jihadists.
Diffuse
We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralised, lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti- American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.
We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalised cells will grow in importance to US counter-terrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the homeland.
The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings.
Iraq
We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.
The Iraq conflict has become the cause célèbre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight.
We assess that the underlying factors fuelling the spread of the movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this estimate.
Four underlying factors are fuelling the spread of the jihadist movement:
(1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness;
(2) The Iraq jihad;
(3) The slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations;
(4) Pervasive anti-US sentiment among most Muslims, all of which jihadists exploit.
Slow the spread
Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement.
They include dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists' radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.
The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution - an ultra-conservative interpretation of Sharia-based governance spanning the Muslim world is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.
Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalise on passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror.
Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist leaders.
Exploit
If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years, political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless, attendant reforms and potentially destabilising transitions will create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit.
Al-Qaeda, now merged with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role. The loss of key leaders, particularly Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups.
Internet
Anti-US and anti-globalisation sentiment is on the rise and fuelling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests.
The radicalisation process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint.
We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the internet to communicate, propagandise, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial support.
Extracted from The National Intelligence Estimate, Key Judgments section, written April 2006. The National Intelligence Estimates are the co-ordinated judgments of 16 separate US intelligence agencies