WE have got to resist the knee jerk reaction, reassuring as a Snoopy blanket and just as irrelevant to adult debate, that everything which goes wrong in the peace process is the fault of the British government.
It isn't. Most of the disagreements between Dublin and London are rooted in a genuine conflict of interests. There are ministers in both capitals who want to believe that they understand and sympathise with the hopes and fears of unionists and nationalists in the North. But the political reality is that each government has a primary responsibility to one of these communities.
There is nothing shameful in this. It was the careful construction of the much criticised "pan nationalist front", headed by the Government, which made peace possible, by reassuring the minority in the North that it would never again be abandoned to the discrimination and injustice of the past.
Similarly John Major, by conducting his side of the peace process with extreme caution, has managed to bring the unionists along and allay their fears that his government is involved in a long term plan to sell them out.
There have been errors of judgment and strategy on both sides. The British have dug themselves into holes from which it has been difficult and embarrassing to escape. But there have also been mistakes which have "Made in Ireland" written all over them. It might help us to do better in the future if we could recognise and admit, at least to ourselves, what has gone wrong.
On Tuesday, replying to a question in the Dail from Bertie Ahern, the Taoiseach spoke of his telephone conversation with John Major a weeks previously, on the eve of the publication of the Mitchell report. They had agreed, Mr Bruton said, that the Tanaiste would comment on the report in the Dail and that Sir Patrick Mayhew would address the House of Commons.
The next morning - last Wednesday - the plan changed and the Government was informed that Mr Major would, after all, speak on the report at Westminster. What is still far from clear is why the British Prime Minister changed his mind and, more seriously, why he decided to announce plans for elections to an assembly in Northern Ireland without warning the Government.
The account which I have been given, by sources in Dublin and London, goes like this.
Both governments recognised that the findings of Senator Mitchell and his colleagues would be seriously embarrassing for John Major. It seems to have been agreed that the best way of limiting the political fall out would be for the two prime ministers to refrain from any immediate reaction.
That way John Bruton would avoid any appearance of triumphalism and Mr Major could reserve his position until he was able to judge which way the wind was blowing.
THEN, on Wednesday morning, an extensive and accurate leak of the Mitchell report appeared in the Irish Independent.
The British assumed, not unreasonably, that it had come from the nationalist side, though whether this happened in Dublin, London or further afield is not known.
Mr Bruton seems to think that it might have come from one of the Conservative MPs who was briefed by the Irish Embassy in London. This is unlikely. Politicians leak to journalists they know and, crucially, from whom they hope to obtain favours in the future. Can you imagine a Fianna Fail TD wasting a really good exclusive on the Daily Telegraph?
By mid morning, the Press Association had picked up the Irish Independents report and was running the story that the Prime Minister was about to climb down on the issue of IRA weapons. The reaction of MPs in the House of Commons was predictable. It became increasingly clear that the government was about to be hammered for caving in to terrorists.
We know what happened next. Forced to defend his position at Westminster - and angry at what he saw as a breach of confidence on the nationalist side - the British Prime Minister set out to make a speech that would deflect attention from the decommissioning issue.
It is, of course, extremely regrettable that Mr Major took this particular course. People to whom I have spoken in Dublin seem to think that he should have resisted the temptation, gone along with the original plan and simply ignored the damage which, he believed, had been inflicted on him by the story in the Irish Independent and the subsequent reports on PA.
Tell that to Albert Reynolds or any other Irish politician who has suffered at the receiving end of similar leaks.
Another common reaction to the events of the past week, in the media and elsewhere, has been to "Remember Out! Out! Out!." The comparison is with 1994, when Margaret Thatcher's offensive rejection of the report produced by the New Ireland Forum led on to much closer cooperation between the two governments and, in time, to the signing of the Anglo Irish Agreement. But there are real and serious differences between the situation then and now.
In his autobiography, Dr Garret Fitzgerald has described how he and his government snatched long term advantage from that political humiliation. It is a fascinating story which deserves serious study just now. The first thing he did was to button his lip, resist the temptation to whinge about the malign intent of the perfidious British.
His senior officials then set out, with great skill and determination, to build a relationship of mutual trust with their British counterparts, which would lock both sides into the task of pushing negotiations forward. In particular, they recognised that they must create a climate of political opinion in Britain which would protect Mrs Thatcher when she had to take the political risks which a new accord would necessarily involve.
One gets little or no feeling in Irish political circles just now of any similar understanding for John Major and the problems which he has to face in taking the peace process forward. On the contrary, he is constantly attacked for being unimaginative and ungenerous in his response to nationalist proposals. On the rare occasions when his political difficulties are recognised, he is accused of being a prisoner of the unionists.
Yet, when things are going reasonably well, most Irish people who have been involved in the peace process - including the more thoughtful members of Sinn Fein - agree that the British Prime Minister represents the best hope we have of reaching a peaceful settlement in the North.
They concede that he has demonstrated political courage and acumen in dealing with a whole raft of critics, inside and outside his own cabinet and party.
Ask them how they feel about the prospect of dealing with Tony Blair, and their eyes glaze over.
Irish nationalism cannot achieve a lasting settlement in the North without the British government or without the unionists. We have to work together. To be successful we must understand the problems facing those with whom we are engaged on this process and ensure that we do not add to them.