Sir, - So-called "decommissioning", the impasse evidently threatening the peace process, is now the focus of concerted attention from the major groups concerned. Certain background facts are important to public perception of the criteria.
Firstly, the debate on "decommissioning" has tended to focus on arms and weapons in nationalist/IRA hands and to overlook or under-emphasise the licensed weapons (over 350,000, I understand, in a total population of 1,750,000) mostly in what may be called unionist or loyalist hands - no less than the unlicensed/illegal weapons also in unionist/loyalist hands.
It does not seem strange that any paramilitary group would be less than enthusiastic about a process which might expect it to "decommission" its weapons without a matching "decommissioning" of those in opposing hands.
Secondly, there is the difficult and delicate question of weapons in the hands of the RUC; in those of former members of the RUC and of RUC auxiliary forces (such as the A, B, and C Specials), almost exclusively unionist/loyalist; and the weapons in the Ulster Defence Regiment, to a considerable extent recruited from former Special Constabularies and/or from the unionist/loyalist population.
Thirdly, while the spectrum of honest, law-abiding people are heartily sick of violence, and bearing in mind that the threats, at present, come from relatively small paramilitary groups, there remain the legitimate concerns and fears of a divided population; among the nationalists, that if unilateral or unmatched decommissioning of IRA weapons and arms occurred, the nationalist population would again be defenceless in the face of any subsequent armed mob violence and outrage, such as occurred in 1969; among the unionists/loyalists, that of also being left vulnerable and defenceless if unionist/loyalist weapons are "decommissioned".
Important questions relating to "decommissioning" are: What happens to the arms? And: Who will have control over them when "decommissioned"? Clearly the second question does not arise if all arms are destroyed, but that seems to be a major stumbling block.
Given the circumstances in Northern Ireland, it would be difficult for an administration there to tolerate the existence of groups not under its control and not giving it allegiance to be in control of arms.
The view that "no government could tolerate an armed body not under its control etc., etc.", or words to that effect, is a slightly different thing. But it could be a significant slightness.
Allegiance seems to be critical in relation to finding a formula that could break the present impasse. How, then, to turn the machinery on the peg of allegiance?
The Civil War (1922-1923) ended with a ceasefire and a dumping of arms. It is undoubtedly a big "IF" - but if all armed and paramilitary bodies were to publicly affirm and give unequivocal allegiance to the Northern Assembly as the established and recognised administration of the day, this might open a way to devising a means of "dumping arms" acceptable and applicable to all. It might be done on, say, a phased basis as a "way-station" towards full implementation of the "decommissioning" terms and timing specified in the Good Friday Agreement.
It might involve a procedure where each body would dump arms under its own control and that of representatives of the decommissioning body, plus, perhaps, a third, neutral, and independent body, composed of members from countries or agencies acceptable to the parties, with mediatorial powers - a mandate to mediate problems arising on the ground before they escalated or got out of hand.
Clearly any such formula must involve a "leap of faith" by all political parties, governments, decommissioning body and illegal armed organisations alike. It would also require a long-term commitment from the decommissioning body, which may not have been envisaged, and the establishment of a mediatorial body, or something similar. But if it broke the deadlock it would be a small price to pay.
I have no doubt that those charged with the duty to do so will have examined and are examining every possible avenue, including, perhaps, the suggestions made here. Nonetheless in the context outlined it seems appropriate in the general interest to put them forward for what they are worth.
Perhaps I should add that there are ample precedents for governments tolerating armed bodies outside their control when it was wise or expedient to do so - the Ulster Volunteers and the National Volunteers come to mind as examples in this country. - Yours, etc.,
Eoin Neeson, Blackrock, Co Dublin.