Sir, - Justin O'Brien (November 3rd) attributes to me the conclusion "that the only option open to the Government was to co-operate with the IRA and extreme republicans generally". I would like the opportunity to put the matter in context.
In mid-August 1969, as an intelligence officer dealing with the North, I was asked by my superior officer, the Director of Intelligence, to submit a paper on the situation in Northern Ireland from a military viewpoint for transmission to the Minister for Defence. I did so on August 23rd, 1969.
I did so against a background of less than two weeks, where the Bogside had exploded; where terror directed against the nationalist community was the order of the day in Belfast; where leaders of the nationalist community came South seeking guns for protection; where Jack Lynch made his "not stand [idly] by" speech; where a Government propaganda unit was mooted; where two Ministers, Haughey and Gibbons, were instructed by Government to meet the Army authorities and did so in Dublin's McKee Barracks; where it seemed that the Army might be called upon to intervene in Northern Ireland at any stage.
In such circumstances, with military intervention a possibility, any competent military leadership would be in neglect of its duties if it did not take into consideration the possibility of using friendly forces in the proposed area of operations. This is a sine qua non of military planning.
Consequently, my report concluded "that authority may be placed in the position of: 1. Restraining extreme republicanism by arresting and interning members of the IRA and its adherents; or 2. Co-operating with the IRA and extreme republicanism generally. . .These are two extreme courses, but to walk a middle course would be extremely difficult. . .A middle course would do little to restrain extreme republicanism. . .Irish troops as part of a UN peacekeeping force would seem to be one feasible middle course, but it is doubtful if the UN Charter allied to British objections would permit it to be put into effect."
I did not see Course 1. as practicable in the circumstances of the time, stating: "This leaves Course 2 as the seemingly acceptable course - with the implicit acceptance of some degree of military involvement."
In the context of the time, with the possibility of Army involvement a reality, it would be difficult to eliminate the possibility of using indigenous friendly forces from the picture. - Yours, etc.,
(Capt) James J. Kelly, Curzon Street, Dublin 8.