Madam, - Tom Carew (August 19) poses a series of questions to advocates of the "European project". Here are some answers which I believe to be relevant.
1. What is the ultimate goal of this project? This question figured in various forms during the pre-referendum debate. It was, for example, sometimes suggested that the EU has embarked on a train journey, the destination of which is unknown. For those who made this point, the unknown character of the destination was a "bad thing".
The question is not, of course, unique to the EU. At birth, each one of us starts on a journey with an unknown destination. In 1922, the Irish Free State started on a journey with an equally unknown destination. Tom Carew's question can be applied to any international agreement, treaty or organisation.
The answer to the question - whether it be for an individual, a country or an international organisation - cannot ever be determined with absolute precision because none of us has the gift of prophecy. The sensible answer is that the course the "train" will take depends on the fundamental values and principles that guide the driver and on how these are applied to the situations - some foreseen and others unforeseen - that will be encountered along the way.
The EU's journey over the past 50 years has been, on the whole, rewarding for those who joined the train at various points along the way. Its founding principles and values have stood the test of time. Some of the way-stations were indeed foreseen when the train set out; others were not. In 1957, there was certainly a hope that Ireland, the UK, Denmark and Norway would get aboard at some stage. Norway chose not to. In 1957, there was no expectation that 10 countries of central and eastern Europe, then under Soviet hegemony, would come aboard.
Essentially, the quality of progress through the journey depends on the application of political wisdom and judgment. I would argue that, for all their faults and failings, EU member-state governments (which, together with the European Parliament, are the decision-makers) have performed reasonably well over the past 50 years.
2. At this point in European history, is there any need or benefit to have "ever closer union", etc, and if so, what exactly is that need or benefit? It seems to me obvious that a group of countries with shared values and principles have a great deal to gain from co-ordinated action to promote the application of those principles and the securing of those values in an increasingly globalised and interdependent world. Energy-deficit countries can gain from co-operating in the face of dominant producers and cartels in a seller's market (e.g an increasingly assertive Russia, Opec). Environmental policy gains in effectiveness from joint action rather than disparate and unco-ordinated measures. The current French presidency of the EU has played a constructive role in the conflict between Georgia and Russia: this would not have been possible if President Sarkozy had not got the weight of the EU behind him. Many other examples could be cited. In the nature of things, we never arrive at a point where we can say that the need for co-ordinated action has ended.
3. Is there now an urgent need to return to the principle of subsidiarity. . .and now embody. . .an over-riding requirement to divest the EU of. . .powers which do not fully meet that fundamental criterion? I would say yes: the Lisbon Treaty contained steps to do just that, but it has been rejected in Ireland.
4. Should all future powers and competencies taken by the EU be specifically time-limited, with a provision for explicit review and debate if any extension is mooted? In the first place, the EU does not "take" powers and competencies: these are conferred on the EU only by unanimous agreement of the member-states. A review of the kind contemplated by Tom Carew took place during the preparation of the Lisbon Treaty, first in the Convention on the Future of Europe (the most public, open and accessible method of treaty review yet devised) and subsequently in the inter-governmental conferences of the member-states.
In his fifth question, Tom Carew instances the Belfast Agreement as an example of workable, open but limited practical co-operation between "good but eternally distinct" neighbours, and not a Trojan horse. It is interesting to note that the Belfast Agreement is not time-limited; neither is there any provision for it to be reversible. It provides for defined and limited co-operation because its objectives are, in the nature of things, limited (but none the less important for that).
EU treaties can also be regarded as agreements between "good but eternally distinct neighbours". In over 40 years of observing, working in and working with the process of European integration, I have not seen any one of the member-states become any less distinctly itself.
In his sixth question, Tom Carew raises the reasonable concern that judicial activism on the part of the European Court of Justice might lead to what he describes as "creeping federalisation or regulation". That concern has been shared by all member-state governments since 1957. It is one of the principal reasons why European treaties are as long, as detailed, as prescriptive and as complex as they are.
Governments wish the parameters of EU action to be as clearly set out as possible by the political decision-makers so as to avoid the need or the opportunity for the Court to make decisions which properly belong to the political sphere. I am no jurist, but I suspect that short, apparently simple and clear constitutions leave more room for judicial activism than do detailed, long, complex ones.
Second thoughts, anybody? - Yours, etc,
ALAN DUKES, Tully West, Kildare.