Sir, Is the peace process becoming even more divisive than the two decades of violence? Recent events have produced almost unprecedented strains between Dublin and London, while in Northern Ireland there is growing polarisation between mainstream unionism and mainstream nationalism we seem to have returned to the old sterile argument over Partition.
Logic is inverted, common sense stood upon its head, and normally rational people say the oddest things. Garret FitzGerald, for instance, wrote (January 27th) that it was difficult for Irish people to appreciate recent British policy on the peace process. Does he discount the probably one million people in Northern Ireland who are generally supportive of Mr Major's approach and who are both saddened and angered by Mr Bruton's apparent espousal of the Sinn Fein case? Or are they no longer Irish?
When he says the introduction of Washington 3 the insistence that "decommissioning" must start before all party talks made no sense to anyone in Ireland, has he not read the Belfast Telegraph opinion poll of mid January which found that 83 per cent of the people of Northern Ireland wanted just that?
Attacks on Mr Major's integrity, implying that his stance on decommissioning is merely a cheap ploy to win unionist votes at Westminster, ignore the fact that a large majority in Northern Ireland quite genuinely believe talks should not begin before decommissioning. It is true that many have doubts about the limitations of Washington 3, with its requirement merely for a start to decommissioning. The DUP, for instance, has made it quite clear that a token start to the giving up of arms would not bring it to the table. But there is also an appreciation that any surrender, or "decommissioning" of IRA arms would constitute an unprecedented concession of principle. It is also assumed that the initial "decommissioning" would be part of a continuing and verifiable process. In that context Washington 3 may not be such an irrational idea as has been suggested There is considerable perplexity, and not just among unionists, as to Dublin's demand that all party talks should be called immediately, without decommissioning. It is manifest that all party talks cannot be held because all parties will not be there indeed the parties representing a majority of the people of Northern Ireland will not be there. When the Mitchell Report identified as its key reality the refusal of the paramilitaries, essentially the IRA, to give up arms before all party talks, it chose to downgrade, if not ignore, that second reality, that the unionist parties would not join such talks before decommissioning.
Each of those factors makes all party negotiations impossible. The Mitchell body, for reasons not obvious, decided that acceptance of one reality the determination of terrorists to hold on to illegal arms was the key to progress. No such prominence was given to the resolution of the democratically elected representatives of a majority that they would not enter talks before decommissioning. In the event the Mitchell Report, at best, said the democrats should meet the terrorists half way.
What then are the motives of Mr Bruton and Mr spring in still insisting upon the calling of all party talks before the end of February without prior decommissioning, when they are fully aware that unionists would not be at those talks. Do they wish to see unionists isolated, pilloried as the blockers of the "peace process while Sinn Fein backed by a still armed, and still active terrorist organisation could pose as moderates and peace makers? What would that achieve in terms of movement towards real reconciliation and a broadly agreed political settlement in the North?
Would it constitute the "facing down" of unionists which some prominent nationalists have long advocated as necessary to a settlement in the North? Is it assumed that the unionist politicians would be so isolated, condemned by world opinion, that they would either cave in or be rejected by a significant section of their traditional support? Such an approach may well commend itself to the more hard line nationalists, but it is hardly based on any realistic assessment of opinion in the North, nor does it tie in with Mr Bruton's own position as it has emerged in recent years.
Pique at Mr Major's abrupt announcement of the elected body last week is understandable, given the existing commitment to the twin track, and to the whole principle of Dublin London solidarity. But to let that spill over into total opposition to the idea of early elections puts a question mark over the real commitment to all party negotiations.
At present there are two obstacles to the commencement of such talks the first is the refusal of the paramilitaries to give up arms, the second is the refusal of democratic politicians to negotiate with the representatives of still armed paramilitaries. Those are formidable obstacles, yet David Trimble, and now John Major, seems to be offering at least a chance of by passing them. If the elections are held, then it seems that all party talks could indeed begin within the scope of the Mitchell recommendations, that is with decommissioning occurring alongside the talks, not before them.
So what is so wrong with elections to set the scene for all party talks? In principle it is surely right that the electorate should have the input into the process that a poll would give. Garret FitzGerald rather oddly fears that if the elections resulted in the failure of the representatives of the loyalist paramilitaries to win any seats, this would have a "potentially negative effect on the negotiating process". What sort of negotiation is he anticipating one among political parties representing various strands of opinion, or one within which political parties are meant to negotiate with people who represent no one and are there only because of their ability to murder? Or is he too, like Albert Reynolds, principally concerned not with accommodation and reconciliation in Northern Ireland, but with a renegotiation of the Partition settlement? Yours, etc., Mornington, Belfast.