Lurgan killings send out confused signals about IRA's real intentions

POLITICIANS of all parties sifted through the ashes of the Northern Ireland peace process yesterday in search of some living …

POLITICIANS of all parties sifted through the ashes of the Northern Ireland peace process yesterday in search of some living embers, but the outlook was grim.

And the three Government parties were particularly depressed by their analysis of the situation, following a number of days of positive developments.

Sinn Fein had received a position paper drafted by the British government detailing how the party could be admitted to all-party talks next September in the event of an unequivocal IRA ceasefire. But within days, two RUC officers were murdered in Lurgan.

The killings themselves were terrible. But what made them particularly depressing, from a political point of view, were the conflicting signals being sent from the republican movement. Sinn Fein and the IRA appeared to be working to separate agendas.

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Only last Saturday, a meeting between Government officials and Sinn Fein in Dublin had generated hope - on the basis of the British government paper - that the arms decommissioning obstacle could finally be surmounted in all-party talks, in the aftermath of an IRA ceasefire.

That the double murder of RUC officers was ordered by the IRA in those circumstances and in the most sectarian part of Northern Ireland did not go unmarked.

Tit-for-tat killings by loyalist dissidents were practically guaranteed as a consequence, along with a long, hot marching season.

In his despair, John Bruton accused republicans of trying to destroy efforts to reach a political accommodation. If Sinn Fein was genuine, he said, it would have "disconnected itself from this kind of action", but it was an integral part of the same organisation as the IRA.

If Fine Gael, the Labour Party and Democratic Left were angry and dismayed by the murder of the two RUC officers and the political message it conveyed - Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats were appalled by the terrible vista which the IRA actions had opened up.

Before the general election Bertie Ahern promised to devote his first few months in government to the establishment of an unequivocal IRA ceasefire and the inclusion of Sinn Fein in all-party talks. He is now in a hard place, with the rock that is the unreformed republican movement threatening his nascent government.

From a situation where Mr Ahern had confidently expected an early IRA ceasefire to mark the formation of his government and a pivotal role as facilitator in smoothing the path of Sinn Fein into all-party talks, he is now contemplating the dangers posed by republican ambiguity.

Fianna Fail is desperately seeking an explanation from Sinn Fein for what happened in Lurgan in the hope that such a development might restore trust between them.

Back in 1993, when Albert Reynolds opened indirect contact with Sinn Fein, it was done on the basis that it would take time for the IRA to declare a ceasefire, but that republicans would hold to their word once it was given. That proposition of IRA good faith is now under serious scrutiny within Fianna Fail.

There is recognition that duplicity may be a new weapon in the IRA's armoury, as suggested by Mr Bruton, but this goes hand-in-hand with an unwillingness to abandon hope of a new ceasefire. The party has hung back from accepting the malign scenario: that the republican movement is a united organisation with a cross-over command structure and that Sinn Fein acquiesces in the "tactical use of violence".

Fianna Fail does accept that senior members of the IRA, as well as Sinn Fein, would have been aware of the contents of the new British government position paper on all-party talks - and changes in relation to arms decommissioning - in advance of the Lurgan killings. And it seeks an adequate explanation for what happened.

It is prepared to accept that "difficult elements" within the IRA were responsible for the killings. And it is adamant that, if this is the case, the republican movement should make this clear.

A limited window of opportunity still exists, of no more than two or three weeks, in which the IRA could declare a ceasefire and facilitate Sinn Fein's entry into the September talks. But there is no positive expectation that this will happen. And, as of now, Mr Ahern has no plans to meet with Gerry Adams.

Looking ahead, the party will support the opening of multi-party talks, in the absence of Sinn Fein, in the autumn, in the hope that agreement can be reached between the SDLP and the unionist parties.

Fianna Fail would, however, favour the admittance of Sinn Fein to such discussions at a later stage - in the event of an IRA ceasefire - provided it was not done in an opportunistic fashion and designed to prevent political agreement. And it sees the Anglo/Irish Agreement as the ultimate bulwark against political failure.

As of now, Mr Ahern is holding the door open for Sinn Fein with difficulty. He has adopted the position taken by Mr Reynolds before the first ceasefire, in being the last one to turn out the lights.

But, as Taoiseach, he will have to behave in a more "balanced" way in responding to the concerns of the Northern Ireland communi ties. He will be sharing government with the Progressive Democrats party which has, traditionally, not been very understanding of Sinn Fein's difficulties with the IRA. And, in a situation of continuing violence, die new government's dependence on the support of Independent TDs becomes a serious handicap.

Mr Ahern's dream of an early IRA ceasefire and Sinn Fein's entry into September talks has been all but shattered by the Lurgan killings.