The signals yesterday from Sinn Fein were ambiguous cautiously optimistic, calculatedly negative. Those from Washington were unequivocal Sinn Fein must now decide to do what is necessary to take its place at the negotiating table. To listen to Mr Mitchel McLaughlin, the breaking of the current deadlock over the IRA ceasefire to enable the party to enter talks on June 10th requires little more than an assurance from the British prime minister that meaningful negotiations are intended and that a snare is not being laid to secure IRA decommissioning with nothing in return.
There was, he said, a "chasm of mistrust" between Sinn Fein and the British government, but in spite of that the required assurance could re create the circumstances of August 1994 when the original cease fire was called. In a situation of this kind, the direction in which the dynamics are tending is all important. Mr Martin McGuinness's statement at the weekend opened the possibility that the IRA would reinstate its ceasefire provided decommissioning was not made a blocking item.
Mr Gerry Adams, apparently contradicting his two Sinn Fein colleagues, has played down the significance of such remarks and also, presumably, the unmistakable message from Ms Nancy Soderberg, Mr Bruce Morrison and others in Washington that there is nothing to gain and much to lose by further prevarication. That may simply be a corrective to any premature optimism, or an informed comment on the state of republican sentiment. Whichever is the true explanation, it is only common sense to do everything possible to build on the more constructive statements by Mr McGuinness and Mr McLaughlin.
Sir Patrick Mayhew's response that there would be "genuine discussions on an open agenda, nothing preordained, nothing ruled out, nothing ruled in has taken public dialogue on Sinn Fein's participation a stage further, as Mr McLaughlin acknowledged. Much more than that will be needed acceptance of the six Mitchell principles of democracy and non violence will require Sinn Fein to give a public commitment not to evade the decommissioning issue (in the context of the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. . . verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission").
If it gives such an assurance, will the unionists accept it? The UUP leader, Mr David Trimble, said last night, after meeting Mr Major at Downing Street, that this was one of the "very difficult issues" that would need to be addressed in the weeks before the talks begin, along with the question of how the Mitchell principles should be handled. But if Sinn Fein has an obligation to ensure that the negotiations on June 10th are all inclusive, by taking the decisions that enable them to participate, there is an equal onus on the largest unionist party whatever the DUP decides not to find reasons to avoid their encounter with history.
It is frequently forgotten that the talks themselves will have a vital role in creating trust without which compromise and agreement will not be possible. The point has been obscured by the long drawn out and divisive preliminaries. There may be grounds for hope in the events of the last few days, but Mr McLaughlin's "chasms of mistrust" will not be bridged until Sinn Fein and the IRA make up their minds that violence has no place in the negotiating process in which they want to play a part.