The arrest of Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade yesterday on charges of corruption and abuse of office is welcome indeed as a confirmation that the young Serbian democracy is coming to terms with the recent disastrous past of its country. Milosevic's party and collaborators in the military and security forces turned the last decade into a cauldron of oppression and war for the nations of ex-Yugoslavia and surrounding states, simultaneously enriching themselves. His arrest on these charges should be recognised by the international community which has put such pressure on Serbia to come to terms with Milosevic as a first step on the road to making him account for his crimes against humanity at the war crimes tribunals in The Hague.
Milosevic's decision to turn Yugoslavia's disintegration to his political advantage by asserting Serb nationalism against its former constituent nations enabled him to mobilise its surviving security apparatus and enrich himself in the process. These latter crimes are the one with which the new Serbian government is now coming to terms. Their painful realisation of how much damage they had sustained and time lost has been brought home by normalising relations with the rest of the world since last autumn's dramatic events which removed Milosevic from power. They have simultaneously had to come to terms with international pressure to bring Milosevic and others charged with war crimes at The Hague to justice in that city. Inevitably such pressure has been controversial within the anti-Milosevic movement. The new president of what remains of the Yugoslav federation, Mr Vojislav Kostunica, has opposed the efforts to bring Milosevic before The Hague tribunal on grounds of his State's law and sovereignty.
Younger members of the government are more willing to contemplate that possibility after he has faced trial for corruption in Belgrade. He should be tried on both counts. But the timing of that outcome will depend on how the evolution of Serbian democracy is orchestrated with international pressure to bring Milosevic to The Hague, for example by denying it aid for reconstruction. Yesterday's positive reaction from American and European leaders appears to take account of these realities. It is to be hoped there will not be premature action to force the Serb government to go further than they are politically capable of doing, despite the pressing need to validate the trial process in The Hague. Milosevic's first and last opportunist resort to Serb nationalism occurred in Kosovo. The fallout from that crisis is still with us there and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for the last two weeks have tested the European Union's new crisis management apparatus to its limits. On balance it has succeeded in finding a war to support the Macedonian government's military campaign against Albanian rebels in the Tetovo region and maintain pressure on them to organise a political dialogue on minority rights capable of forestalling the rebels' appeal while keeping the moderate Albanian parties in the coalition. That tentative success is a great relief to surrounding states and the wider Europe of which the Balkans must increasingly be recognised as a constituent part. This achievement very much remains to be consolidated.