Confusion and indecision are often to be found at the heart of major political events. The crescendo of street protest against the Serbian regime in recent days and weeks are a good illustration of this generals rule. Although the demonstrations against the annulment of local elections are now in their 12th week, they have not resolved the political conflict. Mr Slobodan Milosevic has ducked and weaved under international as well as domestic pressure. But his room for manoeuvre is now narrowing extremely rapidly, following the police resort to violence and the legal deadline on the election annulment today.
Mr Milosevic faces a choice between a much more comprehensive resort to force and an accommodation with the opposition whose logic would seem to lead inexorably to his loss of power. If he opts for a crackdown he will come under huge international pressure and will face a complete loss of authority at home. This was made clear yesterday by the reactions from western governments. It seems unlikely that he could exploit divisions between them and Russia as NATO enlargement is negotiated in coming months. It would also be a great surprise if the courageous and so far remarkably peaceful democratic movement against the election annulments would disappear under a state of emergency; more likely there would be a campaign of disruption which could result in civil war.
On previous occasions Mr Milosevic has systematically played to Serb nationalism when confronted with such choices. He rose to power by provoking a conflict in Kosovo, the Albanian enclave, following it with Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina as Yugoslavia broke up. There is now speculation that he will try to play the Kosovo card again by provoking another conflict there or, much more seriously, to undermine the Dayton accords in Bosnia. This course would appeal to the still substantial layers of support for his regime in rural and provincial areas as well as among the security forces and bureaucracy. But it would be such a palpably opportunistic ruse after three months of protests by crowds whose own nationalism has not been at issue with the regime that it would be most unlikely to convince any but the most craven followers.
Confusion and indecision have been apparent within the regime as it considers which of these routes to take. The least bad option for him would be to enter negotiations with the opposition, leading to agreement on local and national elections and probably a gradual exit from power. But this would be altogether out of character.