The Dayton peace accord on Bosnia Herzegovina is gaining the reputation of being more honoured in the breach than the observance. When Muslim Croat forces took control of the Serb areas in Sarajevo yesterday they entered a part of the city that was burning and occupied only by a couple of thousand old people all that was left of a substantial community many times more numerous. This is a sad commentary on the multi ethnic aspirations of the accord.
Inevitably, accounts differ as to how the Sarajevo Serbs came to leave their homes rather than accept rule by members of the Muslim Croat federation. Many of them believed they would not be safe under such rule they were strongly encouraged to reach this conclusion by leaders who have given only the most grudging approval to the peace accords, often patently rejecting its provisions for reconciliation. The same applies to many elements on the Bosnian side. As a result the international force sent to oversee the agreement was in a weak position to enforce it in the city.
It is a sad commentary on what should have been a day for celebration the reuniting of Sarajevo after four years of seige. The flaws exposed are typical of the larger flaws which critics have identified in the Dayton accords. They were based on a ruthless diplomatic realism by the United States and its Nato allies, on a recognition of fatigue among all the parties to the war and on a determination to enforce human rights and war crimes clauses in the agreement. Inevitably these objectives conflict with one another they require the firmest political management. Monday's meeting between Mr Warren Christopher and the leaders of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia reestablished their priority, endorsed by the arrests announced yesterday of two Bosnians accused of war crimes by the international tribunal.
It may well be too much to expect that leaders and peoples involved in such a cruel and destructive war should be able to practise reconciliation so soon after it has ended. This will be a long process. Unless it is sustained by very firm international engagement it will be far less likely to succeed. It is therefore worrying that there should be such widespread cynicism about the intentions of Croat, Bosnian and Serb leaderships, and continuing uncertainty about whether the international commitment to enforce the agreement will be sustained. Tension and quibbling about policy, logistical matters and funding between the US and EU states in Ifor do not generate confidence.
In the latter half of this year Ireland will occupy the EU presidency, during which time it will have several onerous foreign policy responsibilities. Not the least of them will be to help work out arrangements that must follow on from the Ifor implementation mandate. The US troops are there within a strict timetable, which finishes at the end of the year. It looks as if an international presence will be needed for much longer than that if the agreement is not to unravel. By virtue of its EU role Ireland will find itself at the centre of these negotiations along with its partners which may require calling on the accumulated Irish access to centres of power in Washington if the Dayton accords are to survive.