"When I am dead and opened", said Queen Mary of England nearly 450 years ago, "you shall find `Calais' lying in my heart." Boris Yeltsin's sentiments in regard to Chechnya now can hardly be different from hers after losing the last English toehold in mainland Europe. Chechnya has been the anvil on which his presidency, unable to prevent the drift to political and economic chaos of the last few years, has received what could be its terminal blows. The decision to unleash Russian forces on the rebel Chechens over a year ago to put an end to a state of civil war was shortsighted and brutal and, from Mr Yeltsin's point of view, it has been a humiliating failure.
His anger at the latest sign of Chechen defiance reflects the enormous risks he faces if he should decide to stand for re election in five months' time. The seizure of hostages in Kizlyar, across the frontier from Chechnya in Dagestan, proved something that has always been true against the determination of well organised and motivated guerrillas there is little even the most powerful state can do, unless it exercises absolute control. Post communist Russia is neither as powerful as its Soviet predecessor nor, by a long way, as capable of maintaining absolute vigilance. In his table thumping on television yesterday, Mr Yeltsin displayed the frustration of an old apparaichik at the loss of the means to carry out his will.
Speculation that he may try, nevertheless, to bring the Chechens to heel by force, in spite of the ignominy it may entail, and the certain condemnation by world opinion if it involves a repetition of the crushing of Grozny a year ago, is a measure of his political dilemma. If he does nothing in response to provocation, he admits his weakness success, however, is both problematic and uncertain.
In spite of the widespread revulsion over a hopeless military situation, it is likely that Russian opinion will be inflamed if the hostages are not freed safely. The prime minister, Mr Chernomyrdin, achieved a short lived popularity by negotiating the release last June of hostages seized at Budennovsk in an almost parallel rebel operation, followed by a ceasefire and peace talks. But predictably the resulting agreement for troop withdrawals in return for rebel disarmament has been a non starter, and Mr Chernomyrdin lost ground in the parliamentary election in December.
An outcome that does not benefit a nationalist candidate in the presidential election in May seems unlikely. Either out of deference to popular feeling or from conviction, Mr Yeltsin has shown no inclination to adopt the common sense approach of cutting Russia's losses and conceding the Chechen demands the Chechens, in turn, look as though they are determined to hold out indefinitely. They were not prepared, in 1992, to accept the compromise on sovereignty that was adopted by 18 of the 20 autonomous republics, preventing the wholesale collapse of the former Soviet Union even Tatarstan, the 19th republic, came to terms two years later. Chechnya dug itself in, and has become a potent element in the current regression of Russian politics.
Short of a de Gaulle as in Algeria there is probably no solution, and a continuation of the hardening of Russian attitudes seems the most likely course of events. Mr Yeltsin, with his fragile commitment to democracy and market economics, will not be the only loser, because the world has a stake in Russia's stability and progressive development.