Rejecting Lisbon leaves us in danger of reverting to closer ties with an EU-detached Britain, writes Garret Fitzgerald
THE IRISH State achieved independence in 1922 and absolute sovereignty in 1931, with the reform of the structure of the Commonwealth. What our diplomacy consistently ignored, however, right up to the 1960s, was the stark reality of our continued, humiliating economic relationship with Britain, arising from our dependence on that country as the purchaser of 80 per cent of our exports. (That debilitating dependence was rubbed in by the fact that up to 1979 Irish banknotes carried notice that the denominated amount was "payable at the Bank of England".)
All this undermined our political independence, because it severely limited the practical exercise of our sovereignty. The only remedy for this was to secure free access for our goods and services to markets other than Britain. That alone could free us to pursue economic and political foreign policies independently.
Moreover, what was then little understood in our Anglocentric island was that, since the end of the 19th century, Britain had been the slowest-growing economy in Europe. And access to other, more rapidly growing European markets would be hugely important to our prosperity.
Miraculously, the emergence in the mid-1950s of the European Community offered us a real possibility of just such an escape from our unfortunate economic relationship with Britain.
The importance of this was such that, during our long wait in the 1960s for Britain to become acceptable to France as an EEC member, I suggested that we should consider taking the risk of applying for membership independently of Britain.
While in the 1960s that suggestion received little support, it was not as unrealistic as many then assumed. This becomes clear when one recalls that when, barely a year after we and Britain had joined the then EEC in 1973, an incoming British Labour government seriously contemplated leaving it again, a near-unanimity emerged here that if that happened we should nevertheless remain in the EEC.
What I found interesting throughout the whole of the last half-century was the failure of our Anglophobe and economically challenged extreme nationalists, including Sinn Féin/IRA and various left-wing elements, ever to grasp the liberating and growth-enhancing potential of Irish EU membership.
It was - and still is - as if their Anglophobia has been so all-absorbing as to have mesmerised them into failing to observe anything beyond Britain. As a result of this blind spot they have failed to understand the huge importance of our securing economic as well as political independence from our much larger neighbour - something that could be achieved only through EC/EU membership.
While we remained economically dependent upon, and thus politically tied to, Britain, no one on the Continent would take us seriously. But this all changed when, inside the community, we made our mark, promoting the development of the union, launching both the first meeting of the European Council of Heads of State and Government and the first informal meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, as well as organising six EU presidencies.
The very positive relationships we thus established with our partners brought us great practical benefits, for example, maximising our receipts of structural funds and securing a disproportionate share of milk quotas introduced in the 1980s.
In his letter published on August 14th, Michael Lillis - until his departure from Foreign Affairs in 1988 one of our most brilliant, and also deeply nationalist, of Irish civil servants - was absolutely right to say that Ireland's membership of the EC transformed and enhanced Irish independence, which before then had been measured and defined, constitutionally, politically, and economically, by reference only to our relationship with Britain.
Michael Lillis was also right to add that when, with Britain and Denmark, Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, we - in contrast to these two others - responded to our involvement with enthusiasm. "We discovered," he added, "that we were after all an independent people, masters of our destiny . . . There was no more asking: What would the British do?"
Polls in Britain currently show the Conservatives to have twice Labour's electoral support. If, as seems probable, David Cameron becomes Britain's next prime minister, he is likely either to withdraw the UK from the EU or, more probably, to negotiate some kind of semi-detached association.
Last Saturday, Paul Gillespie pointed out that in those circumstances one of the sure consequences of Ireland's No to Lisbon would be to reposition this State into a closer relationship with a Europe-detached Britain.
These concerns are now widely - if so far quietly - shared by many serious observers. These worries have been intensified among those who have read the remarks made by former French president Giscard d'Estaing to the Daily Telegraph on September 9th. (This disturbing address has not been published or, so far as I am aware, mentioned in our media.)
On that occasion Giscard d'Estaing - still a very influential figure - proposed that the EU's British problem be resolved by offering it a series of "derogation clauses". The resultant "special status" might, he says, include provisions that would limit British posts in the institutions, as well as its participation in Council and European Parliament debates, its right to vote, and have other "financial consequences".
Something along these lines might well be acceptable to a Europhobe British Conservative government - but it could be disastrous for us. Giscard d'Estaing added - pointedly, I believe, with post-Lisbon Ireland in view - that these exceptions might be "sought" by (did he mean subtly imposed upon?) other states. With our European future now gravely at risk, the sooner our Government sorts out its budget and gets back to dealing with our post-Lisbon agenda, the better for Ireland.