The re-engagement of the UN with the governance of Iraq is a delicate but crucial process, writes Noel Dorr.
'The main thing that endears the United Nations to member-governments," Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote in an essay in 1985, "is its proven capacity to fail, and to be seen to fail." Should the UN now be wary? Is it being set up to do just that in Iraq?
On closer examination the O'Brien view is not as cynical as it seems. He does indeed believe that recourse to the UN can be used by a government which wants nothing done and wants to shift the blame.
But it can also be used, constructively, by governments which need a way of climbing down from an unsustainable position - a useful function which makes the world a less dangerous place.
The US and UK governments may have had this in mind when they submitted their new draft resolution to the UN Security Council on Monday last.
Both countries have argued over the past year that they went to war in Iraq to enforce Security Council resolutions; a difficult claim to justify granted that, just before the war, they failed to persuade the council to adopt a resolution which would indeed have authorised the use of force. But they also made it plain throughout that their ultimate purpose was "regime change", a policy not envisaged in any UN resolution.
Regime change proved easy enough once overwhelming force was deployed. But the "nation-building" which should have followed is an altogether different matter for which they seem to have little taste. So now, facing growing difficulties, they are turning back to the UN.
The proposed new resolution is cleverly drafted. It leans heavily on the work done in Iraq over the past few months by the UN Secretary General's representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, a former foreign minister of Algeria, and it puts further responsibilities on his shoulders.
Brahimi consulted widely for months in Iraq and, at the end of April, mapped out a possible path ahead. The draft resolution now endorses his proposals in language which invokes the authority of the Security Council for international peace and security.
The steps are complex. An appointed interim government, to be advised by a national council, will assume authority from June 30th.
In January 2005 there will be elections to a transitional national assembly which will choose a transitional government to hold office for the rest of the year. The assembly will also draft a constitution to be put to a referendum in autumn 2005. If all goes well, a new government will be elected by the end of 2005.
The resolution specifically endorses the first step: the formation of a "sovereign interim government of Iraq" by June 30th. It also approves the whole timetable; and directs Brahimi, and the UN team which he leads, to advise on and support the election process and consensus-building on drafting a constitution.
"As circumstances permit" he is also to promote human rights, reconciliation and judicial reform. Altogether a heavy responsibility for an organisation which was allowed no more than a minimal role last year.
Who will choose the interim government? Enter, again, the indispensable Mr Brahimi. Following his extensive consultations in Iraq, he hopes to propose names by the end of May.
Two aspects of the resolution have been a matter of debate.
First, what will be the position of the coalition forces in Iraq after June 30th? There are differences on this point between the US and the UK. Operationally, they say, their forces will have their own chain of command and there will be "co-ordination" with the new interim government. But will that body have authority to veto an operation?
The resolution refers to "arrangements" for "partnership" which are still to be worked out.
But, even though in theory the multinational force will stay in Iraq only with the consent of the new government, that government, on taking office from June 30th, may find that the multinational forces already have a strong mandate from the council to use force where necessary.
According to the resolution the council would decide, in mandatory language, that the force "shall have authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq including by preventing and deterring terrorism". Not enough attention has been given to this point.
There is another difficulty. The UN team supporting the new government and preparing for elections in Iraq will be dependent for its security on the multinational force which will undoubtedly come under attack.
A "distinct entity" is to be created within it for this purpose. But will this be enough, in the eyes of Iraqis, to maintain the distinctness of the UN role?
A second important issue is sovereignty, a complex matter which, historically, has had both internal and external aspects. Internally, sovereignty implies full decision-making and enforcement authority in a particular territory; externally, independence and recognition by other states in the international system.
Security Council decisions are a basis for international legitimacy. But although the UN, an organisation of sovereign states, may recognise sovereignty, it does not confer it.
So the new draft treads very carefully. An earlier council resolution last October rested on a complex, not to say metaphysical, sequence of definitions. First, it reaffirmed Iraqi sovereignty; then it emphasised the temporary responsibilities and authority of the coalition provisional authority under international law; and finally, it noted that the appointed governing council "embodies" the sovereignty of Iraq until internationally recognised government is established.
Under the new resolution the council would "endorse(s) the formation of a sovereign interim government".
How then will sovereignty, disrupted by war, pass from its "embodiment" in a governing council appointed by the coalition to an appointed interim government to be selected on the advice of Mr Brahimi?
The resolution finesses the question. It seeks to draw, creatively, on the international authority of the Security Council to bridge a gap in the transition of national authority and sovereignty within Iraq.
Will the resolution pass? It seems very likely, although it will probably be amended, perhaps substantially. Whatever some members of the Security Council may feel about the events of the past year, no country on the council has an interest in seeing the situation in Iraq deteriorate further with consequent instability in the region. Some will hope to establish good relations with a new Iraq which may emerge.
So what are the implications of all this for the United Nations?
The UN began in 1945 as a collective security organisation, a continuation of the wartime alliance to maintain international peace in the postwar years. Lacking full support from major powers, it has often proved ineffective in this role.
But over nearly 60 years, as its membership grew from 50 to 191 states, it has become something new and important: a universal organisation of states, the first in history. Its Charter, universally accepted if not always observed, is now a constitution for international society and a basis for international legitimacy.
Many felt that the war in Iraq last year brushed the UN aside as ineffectual, and last September Kofi Annan warned that it faced "a moment no less decisive than 1945". It is good now to see signs of some wish by the "coalition of the willing" to return to it - at least in order to draw on the unique legitimacy which is its Charter.
Will it all work? Ideally, one would not wish to start from here. But there is nowhere else from which to start.
Plainly Brahimi and the UN team he leads are being asked to carry a considerable responsibility. Much will depend on the skill and political judgment he shows in helping to select the members of the interim government.
A cynic might say that it is a good each-way bet. If he succeeds, then all to the good. If he fails, then the governments concernedmay hope that those who argued for greater recourse to the UN will be silenced.
But that would be too facile. This is not an issue on which anyone should want the UN to fail. But whether this new interim government is to be a real step towards true sovereignty - and eventually democracy - will depend, not on the UN or on any outside authority but on how far it wins the support of the people of Iraq. For their sake we must hope it succeeds.
Noel Dorr is a former Irish diplomat and a member of the Irish Times Trust