Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern may yet have to renegotiate the Belfast Agreement, argues Frank Millar, London Editor
In Belfast last week the British Prime Minister insisted he would not countenance a renegotiation of the Belfast Agreement. The Taoiseach readily concurred: there could be no turning back.
They would say that, of course. It is not hard to understand why. Both men have invested heavily in the Northern Ireland peace process. Personal prestige apart, they also understand better than most the potentially grave consequences of having it unravel.
Yet to state the obvious - that they have no wish to see this happen - is not to say it cannot. Indeed, if Northern Ireland remains a democracy, they may in the end have no choice but to go back to the drawing board.
Under pressure in the Commons last week to call fresh Assembly elections as an alternative to suspension, the then secretary of state John Reid acknowledged a simple truth: it is not for any government to dismiss the electorate.
The Northern Ireland electorate entered upon the political process prescribed by the Good Friday accord on a voluntary basis. They were told the Belfast Agreement was rooted in the principle of consent. Unionists certainly understand that the need for their consent implies a right to withhold it. Reluctantly, moreover, they accepted a new definition of consent - one requiring a majority in both communities - because, as John Hume had successfully argued, majoritarianism does not work in a divided society.
So what happens come the elections if a majority of unionists exercises its right to back the No parties and withdraw consent? Could Mr Blair and Mr Ahern still cling to the Thatcherite mantra that there is no alternative? Would they be tempted to change the rules in order to bypass the inconvenient fact that unionists were no longer consenting? Or, faced with a potentially unpalatable outcome, might they simply cancel the elections (and dismiss the electorate) altogether?
In the crisis generated by alleged IRA espionage at the heart of the Northern Ireland Office there was incredulity in London at Dublin's enthusiasm for immediate elections which might very well reward Sinn Féin with a triumph over the SDLP. However, there is a world of democratic difference between a calculation over timing and the suggestion that elections might be indefinitely postponed because governments fear they will not yield the desired result.
In the short time available before a commitment to fresh elections is due, both governments will bend their resources to try and prevent such an outcome. They will be banking again on the poor quality of their unionist opposition, and the received wisdom that even the most recalcitrant unionists enjoy being in the big house at Stormont.
Reading the smoke signals now emanating from what might be termed the modernising wing of the DUP, they may also be assuring themselves that even the Paisleyites grasp that Sinn Féin isn't going away and that inclusivity is the only show in town.
Given weary unionist acceptance of the underlying realities, and some significant choreography involving IRA moves (or at least commitments) on disbandment and decommissioning, London and Dublin will hope to have the Executive reinstated by February. This would pave the way for elections, in which the Ulster Unionists and SDLP might yet fend off the widely predicted rise of Sinn Féin and the DUP. Even if they don't, a new mood in Dublin suggests a readiness (some in the SDLP suspect, even, an eagerness) to respond to a new configuration which puts Gerry Adams and Peter Robinson in pole position - although London plainly hasn't given up on David Trimble.
The suspicion must be that some in Dublin misread and under-estimate Mr Robinson, and wilfully disregard the temper and disposition of a DUP still attuned to the political instincts of its leader, Ian Paisley.
Perhaps not. Maybe the unionist quarrel will ultimately resolve itself into a low-grade struggle over jobs and ministerial cars. In truth neither unionist party can wholly escape the suspicion that their approach to seemingly great and contentious matters has on occasion been governed by calculations of the personal and party variety.
However, this seems unlikely next time around, not least because widening communal distrust has seen the institutions fall into suspension against the backdrop of shrinking unionist support even for power-sharing with the SDLP.
Dr Reid's successor as Northern Ireland Secretary, Paul Murphy - whose appointment yesterday ensures continuity of policy - will be hoping that an imaginative IRA response to Mr Blair's "crunch point" challenge will turn that tide back.
However, it seems clear that if that is to happen, it will not be by return to groundhog day - or the temporary solutions which have carried the process through what Mr Blair described as "4½ years of hassle, frustration and messy compromise". This time, in his words, there must be "acts of completion".
Mr Trimble appears content with that. Yet how is IRA decommissioning and disbandment, even if offered, to be measured? Does anyone believe the IRA will stand down and abandon even a defensive role while their community remains under threat from loyalists who seem exempt from these processes? Have the unionists weighed and understood the implications of Mr Blair's promise in return to give "whatever guarantees" are required of him (presumably by republicans) in respect of full implementation of the agreement? Following the revelation of the alleged IRA spy ring, are the unionists now more sanguine about the prospect of republicans signing up for membership of the Policing Board?
Mr Trimble's pro-agreement unionists might be kicking themselves for having botched earlier opportunities to resolve these matters, knowing their electorate will now be more demanding.
Certainly if Mr Blair does intend completion now, it is hard to see how they can be resolved quickly. Moreover it may be that further policing reform will require a longer-than-intended transition period if wider public confidence is to be sustained.
And beyond all these, there remains the issue which has contributed to the erosion of unionist support for the agreement: Sinn Féin's repeated assertion that it marks but a transition on the road to Irish unity.
Unionists were told they had won a great victory when their opponents signed up to the principle of consent. But in the matter of future constitutional change it seems clear that republicans and nationalists still adhere to the principle of consent by a simple majority - and not the principle of dual consent from which the agreement derives its operational imperative.
The effect, compounded by anticipation of the census returns, has been to tell unionists they are locked into a sectarian headcount at the end of which they will have no choice but to face their fate in a united Ireland.
For as long as this belief/ contention/hope holds sway, it will subvert any effort to reconcile the two communities in Northern Ireland. For the unionists, still inside the United Kingdom, have already abandoned their perceived rights as a majority. And if the consent of a majority of both communities is required to run a mere Stormont administration, it is plainly nonsense to suggest the emergence of a simple nationalist majority would be sufficient to effect a change of sovereignty and statehood.
Dual consent surely must cut both ways. And whether under cover of a renegotiation or, as governments would prefer, a review, this is an issue central to the survival of the agreement which simply isn't going to go away.