We are not looking at Canary Wharf, Mark 2. The peace process has received a serious blow, but the present crisis should focus minds and give all the parties involved time to reflect on what is at stake for the future of all the people of Northern Ireland.
There has been a tendency on the part of both governments to cruise along in the blithe hope that, somehow, everything would turn out all right on the night. The Executive, after all, was up and running. Everyone, even the DUP, seemed pleased with the opportunities it presented. Public approval was running high. Now we are forced to recognise how deep are the suspicions of bad faith on both sides.
The IRA statement pulling out of the de Chastelain commission has probably ensured that there will be no quick fix. That may be no bad thing, if it means that the problems standing in the way of a stable settlement are dealt with, rather than being pushed further down the line in the hope that they will, somehow, disappear.
There is still time. If there is one important gleam of hope, it is that there appears to be no desire for a return to violence on the part of the IRA or the broader republican movement. This is not to rule out the possibility of sporadic acts, or even some atrocity, by dissident groups. But, apart from the anger expressed in its most recent statement, the IRA has been insistent that it represents no threat to the peace process. The threatened split has been, so far, avoided.
There are other constructive factors in play. David Trimble's leadership of his party has been secured. Those close to him have been given space to consider how they should proceed from here. They need to understand that a severe blow has been dealt to Gerry Adams and his closest colleagues. If they want to bring Sinn Fein back on board, they would do well to avoid any display of schadenfreude.
This weekend the Sinn Fein leader will have the task of convincing his party's ardcomhairle that it is worth making another attempt to "shore up" an ailing peace process. Because the collective leadership of Sinn Fein maintains a public front of staying "on message" there is a tendency to think there are no problems of dissent within the party. But Peter Mandelson, of all people, should know that tensions can exist in such circumstances.
In the short term there is no threat to the joint leadership of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. But there is anger at the way the situation has developed in recent days and weeks, and a widespread perception that the British government has "caved in" to the unionists. "Nothing has really changed in 30 years" is a phrase one hears a lot.
For the moment, this anger is directed at the unionists and at Peter Mandelson. But, inevitably, questions are already being asked as to whether Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness misjudged the situation from the start. There is growing disillusionment at grassroots level with the political process and a reluctance to become involved in any review of the Belfast Agreement.
The IRA's decision to pull out of talks with John de Chastelain's commission has been widely condemned as a dangerous setback to the peace process, and one which can only add to unionists' concerns about decommissioning. That is not how the situation looks to Sinn Fein.
On the contrary, the IRA is seen as having made a serious attempt to resolve the decommissioning crisis - by recognising for the first time that weapons and explosives would have to be put "beyond use" - only to have its efforts thrown back in its face. This is not simply a question of a minority within the IRA holding the whole peace process to ransom. Many of those who support Gerry Adams's move towards a political strategy have themselves been active in the IRA. They resent, as bitterly as any dissident, the hint that the IRA should "surrender" arms and see this as an attempt to criminalise their involvement, however long ago that may have been.
Ironically, the IRA's decision to withdraw its co-operation from John de Chastelain's commission may help Gerry Adams in dealing with his party's governing body on Saturday. It gives public expression to the anger that exists within the republican movement, while avoiding any threat of a return to violence. But it also underlines, in the starkest possible fashion, the need for all the parties involved in the peace process to engage in a radical rethinking of the decommissioning issue.
How could it have happened that both Dublin and London were so ill-prepared for dealing with a crisis which everybody knew was coming at the end of January? The Government of this State appears to have been all over the place, with the Taoiseach insisting one day that there must be some gesture from the IRA, and then blaming the British for following the logic of this line of argument by suspending the executive.
Peter Mandelson clearly deemed it necessary to preserve David Trimble, but having done so, failed to offer anything that might have reassured the republican movement that he is still committed to all the parties in an even-handed fashion. He is now seen by many nationalists as being firmly in the unionist camp, an impression he needs to dispel as soon as possible.
In what originally may have been a laudable desire to spread the blame equally, Seamus Mallon has compounded the confusion. There is now a growing belief in both communities in the North that the SDLP might be persuaded to take part in an executive with unionists, while excluding Sinn Fein. This has not worked in the past and there is no reason to suppose that it would in the future.
This peace process weathered far greater difficulties in its early days because its main architects - John Hume, Albert Reynolds and Gerry Adams - had a clear idea of what they wanted to achieve, and a blueprint for building it. They persuaded the British to become partners in this venture, but the original drive came from this side of the Irish Sea. There is an urgent need for a return to the drawing board, deploying the same levels of commitment and political skill. Otherwise the prospects are bleak.