WORLD VIEW:Numerous protagonists with diverse and conflicting agendas are competing for power, writes MICHAEL JANSEN
THE BRIEF uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were relatively uncomplicated affairs, pitting people power against long-reigning presidents and their security services, but the protracted unrest in Syria is not straightforward at all.
In Syria, numerous protagonists with diverse and sometimes conflicting agendas are competing for power.
At the apex of the government side is President Bashar al-Assad, who has attempted to ward off unrest by promising reforms that he pledges will be implemented once there is peace and quiet.
He may or may not agree with hardliners in the military and security services who want to crush the revolt without making any political or economic concessions to the protesters.
In addition, to the regular security agencies and the army, the regime can count on armed enforcers, black-clad shabiha, loyal members of the Assads’ heterodox Shia Alawite community. Shabiha are considered the most fierce and cruel of the regime’s supporters in dealing with protesters.
The protests were launched in mid-March in the southern agricultural town of Deraa by the families of 15 teenagers arrested for scrawling on walls slogans adopted by the Egyptians. The most provocative was: “The people want the end of the regime.” The youths were badly beaten and detained, prompting their relatives to demonstrate. When disaffected elements joined in, the provincial authorities mounted a harsh crackdown.
Popular protests grew and spread. In contrast to the Egyptian uprising, protests have been violent. Offices of the ruling Baath party and police posts have been torched, statues of the late president Hafez al-Assad toppled, and banks and automatic teller machines vandalised.
Many genuine protesters had economic motivations. Some were farmers forced off their land by drought; others were jobless workers demanding employment. They shared a deep resentment against businessmen and officials who had benefited from the recent decentralisation of the economy and the opening to foreign commerce.
Mysterious armed elements became involved and the outlawed Syrian Muslim Brotherhood exploited the unrest to verbally abuse the government and physically attack the security forces. The brotherhood, defeated in the battle of Hama in 1982, is determined to exact revenge. Weapons have been smuggled across Syria’s borders with Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, enabling militants to seize territory, notably along the northern border with Turkey, from which they are being expelled by the army.
Opposition figures inside Syria and abroad see the protests as a means to oust the autocratic regime. Since foreign media are banned from the country, opposition activists have tried to shape external perceptions by providing sometimes exaggerated reports on what has been said to be happening on the ground.
But the opposition has no clear agenda and is fragmented. Underground co-ordination committees have emerged in many localities but remain shadowy. Local regime opponents tend to be more moderate than those outside, particularly embittered Muslim brothers.
This week’s gathering of 160 regime critics in Damascus has deepened the split between moderates and radicals. Moderates who took part called for an immediate halt to the crackdown, the right to protest peacefully, the release of political prisoners, media freedoms and the return of refugees. They vow to establish a democratic system in Syria by peaceful means.
While the government has announced it will begin dialogue with all factions on July 10th, this has been rejected by militants who insist there is no alternative to toppling the regime. Divisions among the opposition factions have seriously weakened them. This encourages the regime to believe it can stay in power.
There are other reasons for its optimism. Scores, perhaps hundreds of thousands of people have taken part in the protests rather than millions as in Egypt. There is no iconic Tahrir Square in Syria, no focus for dissent. The natives of Damascus and Aleppo, the two most populous cities, have not risen as did Egyptians in the country’s main cities. In Damascus and Aleppo there have been massive, stage-managed pro-government rallies that have attracted genuine support.
While abstainers and government supporters may agree with demands for reform and democratisation, they are not prepared to risk challenging the government. Many in the Sunni merchant class and the Christian communities support the government because they fear they could lose their investments and businesses or that the country could break apart. A slogan adopted by conservative Sunni militants is: “Alawites to the tomb, Christians to Beirut.”
The government has exploited communal fears to keep in line moderate Sunni, secular and minority citizens.
An army coup is unlikely. Senior officers are largely loyal Alawites and defections from the Sunni ranks have been limited. But neither side can prevail by using force. Therefore, a peaceful transition to multi-party rule is essential if unrest is to subside and the economy is to be saved from collapse, which could in the long term produce anarchy.
Concern over this possibility is putting pressure on both Assad and the local opposition to accept a US-promoted “road map” to end violence, reach an agreement over the transition and ensure accountability for the deaths of 1,400 civilians and 500 policemen and soldiers reportedly killed during the revolt.