India's decision yesterday not to send troops to Iraq because a suitable United Nations resolution is not in place to mandate it provides further confirmation that the post-war US-British occupation is in deep trouble.
India had been asked to provide a division of some 15-20,000 troops to patrol the northern town of Mosul. Its failure to agree, along with indications that large NATO states such as France and Germany have similar reservations concerning the UN mandate, has forced United States leaders to admit publicly that up to 150,000 American troops will need to remain in Iraq for several years if that state is to be stabilised. Such a prospect is causing much greater disquiet in US and British public opinion, stoked by the mounting casualties caused by Iraqi resistance and the growing controversy over whether voters were misled about the reasons for going to war. Troop promises by Poland, Spain, central European and Baltic states, Thailand, Mongolia and Fiji will not make up the numbers needed.
Both Mr George Bush and Mr Tony Blair have an unenviable task in navigating these pathways of political commitment and trust, especially since they were so convinced they were right to go to war despite the lack of an explicit UN mandate, and were so determined to limit the UN's subsequent role. When they meet in Washington on Thursday they will have to face disagreements on the source and quality of intelligence used to justify the case for war, whether British citizens should be tried by US military courts in Guantanamo Bay and - most important - whether to seek a more comprehensive UN mandate to deal with post-war Iraq.
This would make it easier to encourage other states to join in the task of stabilising and democratising Iraq, but at the cost of substantially diminished US and British control over the political process there. The inaugural meeting of a US-appointed governing council over the weekend is at best a tentative first step in bringing self-government, very much subject to US control. Even so, it reflected deep-seated disagreements about the future course of Iraqi politics. The degree of political, administrative and security ill-preparedness of the occupying authorities since the end of the war has eroded the reputation of neo-conservatives in Washington who urged maximal US unilateralism in order to reduce international influence. The difficulties encountered have affected their credibility, but not as yet the administration's determination to see out the present policy approach. Whether that can be sustained into an election year remains very much to be seen.