Mark Durkan has spoken of creating a 'new nationalism' that seeks unionistconsent. But post-Belfast Agreement, it is not at all clear what newarguments are available to him, writes Dennis Kennedy
The SDLP now has a new logo to go with its new leader, but Mark Durkan's claim that it is a party undergoing radical change sits uneasily alongside his insistence, at the unveiling of the logo, that the party's goal is still to unite the island and its people.
That, surely, is territorial nationalism at its most traditional. Not so traditional is his justification for the pursuit of political unity - he sees it as holding out a guarantee of permanent peace, economic growth and an inclusive and fair society. Is this switch from the tired old arguments of geography, history and "the nation" the radical change in the party's thinking to which he refers?
Earlier this year, in what was clearly intended to be an important statement of the SDLP's post-Hume ideology, Mr Durkan outlined to the Oxford Union his vision of what he termed a "new nationalism", the goal of which was an "integrated, agreed Ireland".
He made it clear that by this he meant political unity achieved by peaceful means and with consent. Hardly a new nationalism, as Seán Lemass had propounded the same objective to the same Oxford Union almost half a century earlier, in 1959.
What was new was the emphasis on "a genuine exercise to persuade unionists of the merits" of such unity. This, he said, was an essential, defining part of his new nationalism. As an opening shot in a campaign to engage unionists in a dialogue on unity, the Oxford speech turned out to be a blank. A version of it appeared as an article by Mr Durkan in the Irish Times the following day but provoked no debate.
Perhaps there is now an opportunity to relaunch the debate, starting with the "defining new element" - the onus on nationalists to persuade unionists of the merits of unity. Up to now, nationalist persuasion has focused on London and Washington.
If Mr Durkan's new nationalism has direct persuasion of Northern unionists as its key element, then what are his arguments? Crucially, what new arguments can he produce to persuade unionists that Irish unity is a good and desirable thing? They must be new because, post-Belfast Agreement, much of the nationalist catechism is obsolete. We can forget about the "historic integrity of the island", about denunciations of partition as "unjust" or imposed from outside.
Under the agreement, the division of the island accords with the desires of the people of the island, as democratically expressed in the two referendums.
Almost 20 years ago, the New Ireland Forum Report of 1984 listed the economic benefits which, it argued, would result from unity:
1) efficiency by ending duplication and facilitating integrated promotion of investment, exports and tourism;
2) development of oil, gas and minerals for the whole island;
3) one economic policy, single currency and common tax regimes for the island.
Today many of the benefits listed under the first two points are attainable under the Belfast Agreement without unity. The third, an integrated economy under one currency, could be achieved only by tearing Northern Ireland away from its largest market, and its vital source of public finance.
With any luck, and a British return to sanity on things European, we may all at some point enjoy a single currency and a unified tax regime within the EU, again without unity.
Nothing in these arguments is likely to justify to unionists the enormous social, political and economic upheaval that a transfer of sovereignty would entail. To many the Belfast Agreement has already delivered an agreed and integrated island in that the people of both parts have endorsed the agreement and we now have an increasing degree of integration.
Mr Durkan now asserts that political unity is the only path to peace on the island. But he has yet to produce detailed arguments to support such a contention.
Why should one suppose that violent elements in loyalism would more happily settle down in an Irish state than their republican counterparts in a British one? Would a unionist minority in a united Ireland have any greater guarantee of "inclusion" than that offered to nationalists in Northern Ireland under the Belfast Agreement? If Mr Durkan is serious about a new nationalism he will have to develop a whole new set of convincing arguments.
But the fundamental corollary to making persuasion of unionists the defining element of new nationalism is confronting the possibility that persuasion will not succeed.
How long can Mr Durkan's new nationalism retain the pursuit of an unobtainable objective as its primary goal and retain any credibility as a political ideology? Wherein does Mr Durkan's nationalism lie? Many Northerners, including, I suspect, many unionists, have no problem with an Irish identity. We all live on the island of Ireland, we share in its history, its varied culture, its attractions and its frustrations. Better communications, increased mobility and an ever-growing cross-Border network of contacts mean we can all live more and more in the context of the island.
What drives Mr Durkan to cling to political unity? He is, we know, desperately fighting with Sinn Féin for the nationalist/Catholic vote, in which contest he deserves all sympathy and support. But is continuing to espouse an outdated political nationalism the best way to do it?
Dennis Kennedy is a Belfast-based academic and commentator