Any doubts about our European engagement pose serious dangers to our economy, writes Garret Fitzgerald
FACED WITH the Irish negative vote on the Lisbon Treaty, Europe's governments have wisely swallowed their negative feelings about this setback to seven years work on this project and have shown a willingness to work with our Government in tackling the consequences of this vote.
Whatever about the potential longer-term effects of this negative vote upon Irish interests within the community - for example in relation to future negotiations on agricultural issues - the immediate interest of the union clearly lies in helping us to find a way out of the present crisis.
I am sure that this helpful reaction will have been assisted by the EU ambassadors accredited to our state who will have followed the referendum campaign attentively and will have advised their governments about the need to react as constructively as possible. This is precisely the kind of situation in which diplomats have an important role to play.
There is a clear understanding among all concerned that finding a way out of this jam will take some time. And, although the treaty was to have come into force at the start of next year, if a way ahead has begun to emerge by next autumn, there could be some leeway about that deadline.
Our supreme national interest clearly lies in remaining fully engaged within the European Union.
Not alone would the emergence of any doubt on this issue put at growing risk external investment in our high-tech industry and services (upon which our remarkable prosperity has been so largely based), however irrational this may seem there is also a downside risk that our financial stability could also be affected.
This is because financial confidence is psychological rather than rational - as we have recently seen, with the US subprime mortgage issue spreading irrational fears that have affected the availability and terms of mortgages in Ireland. I am not sure that our public opinion is alert to the dangers that our economy would face if doubts of any kind were to be raised about the character of our European engagement.
Last Wednesday, Sinn Féin explained that they want our Government to invite our 26 partners to renegotiate no less than 17 aspects of the treaty. This would involve removing a number of articles completely and amending many others - some of them in ways that Sinn Féin have not even felt able to specify. This is what they describe as a "modest and achievable" goal.
If our Government were in fact to follow such an enormously wide-ranging renegotiation agenda, we would instantly forfeit the remaining confidence and goodwill of our partners. As Sinn Féin must know - and may in fact intend - pursuit of such a course would put at risk our continued participation in the union.
There is, however, one treaty provision that can in fact be changed by a unanimous vote in the European Council. Article 17.5 of the treaty provides that as from November 1st, 2014, "the Commission shall consist of a number of members . . . corresponding to two-thirds of the number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number" (emphasis added).
It is clear that the idea of Ireland being absent from one out of every three successive commissions worried many Irish voters.
Now, if, as seems to be the case, a number of other states are also unhappy with this rotating arrangement for the commission, it might be worthwhile suggesting that agreement be sought on using this provision to deal with this issue. In this connection I have to say that, while I saw the value of a smaller and more effective commission sitting around the table to take decisions, I have not been convinced that the Lisbon Treaty solution to this problem was the best way of securing such an outcome.
There are other ways in which this problem could be tackled. One way would be to appoint a full set of commissioners, one half of whom would be the decision-makers for a first period, with the others sitting in on their discussions and then replacing them during a second period. In that way every member state would be present throughout, but at any given time the decision-making group would be small enough to act effectively as an executive, able to resist more effectively any pressures from larger states.It would, however, be absolutely essential that any such solution would involve strict equality between larger and smaller states. Any departure from this principle would be totally unacceptable. We must at all costs avoid any move towards a directoire of larger states, at either commission or council level something that as foreign minister I succeeded in blocking in the autumn of 1974.
Most of the other issues raised during our referendum debate would lend themselves to being clarified in a binding declaration to which all member states subscribed. For, on each of these issues raised by the No side in the referendum debate, the argument related to the meaning of words in the treaty.
A declaration incorporating a set of statements about these issues, expressed in plain language, could be prepared for endorsement by all our partners, making explicit and unambiguous the provisions protecting Irish interests that are already contained in the legalistic language of the treaty.These are the kinds of matters that could usefully be discussed with our partners.
Because what we are now faced with is a national crisis, the Government might in the meantime wish to reflect on whether it might be desirable to invite the main Opposition parties into consultations on the forthcoming negotiations. And those political parties might perhaps reflect on whether such participation might serve the national interest.