The O'Flaherty fiasco has belatedly set off some serious political discussion on the manner in which public appointments by government are made.
Of course, most public appointments are independently made by the Civil Service Commission or the Local Appointments Commission, which were both established by our first government after the foundation of the State.
The appointments over which politicians retain control are relatively few, but, while these include some low-paid posts such as messengers in Government Departments, they also include some high-profile appointments such as judges, secretaries-general of Government Departments, advisers to ministers, directors of State bodies, and, of course, appointments to major European bodies.
Quite different considerations apply to each of these types of post. In some cases governments have introduced voluntary constraints on their range of choice, which effectively limit, or at any rate reduce considerably, the possibility of using these appointments to reward party supporters.
But in other cases the Government's discretion remains unfettered, and even where pre-listing of possible candidates has been introduced, the number of names put forward is sometimes so large as to leave the way open to political favouritism.
This is the case, for example, with the vetting procedure introduced some time ago for the appointment of judges. This precedent involves the submission by an independent body of seven names to the government, which then exercises its constitutional prerogative by choosing to select from among this list.
However, it would be surprising if among seven suitable lawyers there were no supporters of whatever government might be in office, so this does not eliminate political bias in such appointments, although it does offer protection against unsuitable appointments. If these lists were reduced to, say, three names, the political factor would be considerably reduced.
Another approach, suitable in certain cases only, would be to delegate the making of certain appointments to outside bodies. Thus, in early 1983 Dick Spring dismissed a number of party supporters who had been appointed to An Bord Pleanala by Ray Burke after the two dissolutions of the Dail in June 1981 and November 1982; introducing a Bill providing for the nomination of members other than the chairman by groups of organisations concerned about environmental and planning issues.
This was designed to safeguard this crucially important body against efforts to politicise its work, which could have ended in the corruption of its processes.
In a recent statement, Ruairi Quinn pointed out that governments sometimes have difficulty in finding suitable people to fill posts - a point I can endorse from personal experience - and has suggested that a national "talent bank" be established in which individual citizens who wish to serve in public positions could register so as to be available for selection.
Such an arrangement would certainly widen the range of choice of governments, but if the process were restricted to self-selection without subsequent independent vetting, it could lead to some very odd appointments indeed.
We would clearly need an independent commission of the kind that exists in New Zealand to vet such a list, and Labour might usefully add this element to its talent-bank idea. Fine Gael might also consider action along these lines when preparing what John Bruton has described as "radical proposals" being drawn up on public appointments.
Another method of ensuring the quality of public appointments, which already has the support of both these Opposition parties, is the vetting by a Dail committee of certain appointments.
Ruairi Quinn has suggested that potential nominees for key positions be required to give evidence to such a committee as to their suitability for the position proposed for them. Clearly this could not be applied to all the hundreds of public appointments in the discretion of the government of the day, but it could, as John Bruton has suggested, be used for what he has described as "all major national and international appointments".
ail chamber, that would be contrary to the tradition of most committees of the House. In practice, such a system would be likely to deter governments from proposing names of unsuitable political supporters for important posts. Why is there such a demand by a significant minority of party supporters for public positions of this kind?
In most cases the payments made to holders of such positions are either confined to expenses or, if a fee or salary is involved, the amounts are small by comparison with similar positions in the private sector. Some of those involved are people genuinely concerned with public service, the factor that in many cases brought them into politics in the first instance.
The prevailing cynicism about party politics has made it fashionable to deride or dismiss the possibility of such motivation, but that is an attitude shared by few who have any real knowledge of the political scene.
Nevertheless, it would be starry-eyed to suggest that other factors do not also motivate some people engaged in party political activity. One cannot exclude less worthy factors, such as a desire for recognition and prestige, and in some cases financial gain, often on quite a small scale, may also be a factor. Even the relatively small payments to directors of State companies will be greatly valued by some party supporters who have very limited means.
And there may also be other privileges attaching to public positions. The exceptional political demand for positions on the board of Aer Lingus (which in my view contributed to the poor performance of the company during much of the 1980s) was certainly not unconnected with the privilege of free or very low-cost air travel enjoyed by its directors.
Even on boards or committees where no fee or salary is paid, there can nevertheless be a mercenary element. The payment of the Civil Service mileage rate for attendance at meetings some distance away from an appointee's home can be a source of additional tax-free income.
The day-return fare from Cork to Dublin is £15 midweek, or £33.50 on other days. But for a 1,201cc-1,500cc car, the mileage rate for a 320-mile return journey from Cork to Dublin is £196.50, in addition to which there are payments not just for overnight expenses but also for day-trips of more than five hours. The temptation to take the train while charging the car mileage rate must be strong.
Many party politicians tolerate, or even actively support, the present practice of political appointments, and see nothing untoward about favouring their supporters in this way, whether or not those concerned have much to contribute to the board or committee to which they are appointed. These politicians seem to be unaware of the damage done to the reputation of politics by abuses of the present system.
However, the leaders of the parties cannot be oblivious to the growing public disenchantment with many undesirable aspects of our party political system. It is up to them to persuade their TDs to accept the urgent need for reforms designed to prevent an erosion of confidence in our democratic system on the part of an electorate that has been aroused by recent events to an unwonted distaste for political malpractices that had hitherto been tolerated or ignored.
gfitzgerald@irish-times.ie