Before any UN force deploys in Lebanon, there are some crucial questions to be addressed, writes Dr Ray Murphy
The leaders of the G8 industrial nations and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan have called for the swift deployment of international troops in southern Lebanon to end the escalating violence. The British prime minister, Tony Blair, proposed a "stabilisation force" or some similar multinational force deployment in southern Lebanon.
Among the suggestions being made for such a force is one from the French president, Jacques Chirac, who called for the setting up of a border surveillance cordon sanitaire along the Israeli-Lebanese armistice line and a mandate which included the disarming of the Hizbullah militia. It seemed to be forgotten initially that there was already a UN peacekeeping force present in south Lebanon and that it has been there since 1978.
The situation in Lebanon presents a serious dilemma for the UN. Intervention in such a conflict is fraught with pitfalls and amounts to a no-win situation. The UN is often blamed for failing to resolve intractable problems not of its making. Any UN peacekeeping operation can only succeed if given the mandate and the means to do so. There had been talk of an aggressive or robust mandate for the proposed force, but it is difficult not to conclude that many commentators do not appreciate the complexity of the issues.
There is a danger that Israeli action in Lebanon will ignite long-simmering religious and political tensions there. Civil war, not unlike that which broke out in April 1975 between Christian factions and leftist Muslim Lebanese supported by the PLO, is a very real prospect. This led to the collapse of the Lebanese administration, the division of the security forces and Syrian intervention.
It was not until April 2005 that the last of the Syrian forces withdrew. The establishment of the current UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon (Unifil) was prompted by an Israeli invasion in 1978 after a group of Palestinian guerrillas attacked a civilian bus along the Haifa-Tel Aviv highway, killing 37 Israelis and injuring another 76.
Two days later, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 425 and 426, establishing Unifil. The prompt international response then is in stark contrast with that of the present crisis.
The controversy surrounding the actual adoption of Resolution 425 provides important clues to understanding the problems confronted by the force on the ground. Then, like now, there was a lack of political consensus within the Security Council. The mandate which was ultimately agreed did not reflect the problems associated with the presence at the time of the PLO in southern Lebanon and the Israeli determination to occupy part of this by proxy. The fact that the debate in 1978 ignored the Palestinian problem, and the need for a comprehensive settlement of the overall Middle East question, caused many members to vacillate in their express support for the force. In the event, the establishment of a peacekeeping force with ambiguous and unrealistic objectives and terms of reference was agreed to hastily in order to solve the immediate crisis.
Like today, the urgency then of reaching some agreement on the crisis precluded consideration of a more long- term solution. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Unifil encountered major difficulties in implementing its mandate.
There is no reason to believe that any new peacekeeping force will fare any better. There are some crucial questions that need to be addressed before any troops deploy.
Mixed signals are coming from the Israeli government about the plan to deploy such a force. It is essential that there first be some kind of ceasefire agreement, and right now both Hizbullah and the Israelis seem to want to continue fighting. Without the agreement of the parties to the conflict, there can be no prospect of a UN force deploying.
As Unifil discovered to its cost, agreement by leaders or governments does not always translate into co-operation on the ground. Unifil did not have an agreed area of operations at the outset and this significantly impeded its deployment in the early days. It is unlikely that this basic lesson from the current operation has even been considered by those advocating a new peacekeeping force.
Other more fundamental issues must also be addressed. This is not an inter-state conflict. Lebanon has not attacked Israel and this fragile democracy does not have the capacity to restrain or disarm the Hizbullah militia. UN Resolution 1559, which was adopted in 2004, calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias (a clear reference to Hizbullah). It also supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. A new UN force cannot ignore this resolution, but it constitutes an impossible task for any such force.
According to Unifil's 1978 mandate, the UN interim force went to southern Lebanon to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security and assist the Government of Lebanon in the restoration of its authority. How will the proposed new international force disarm Hizbullah? Any attempt to do so will bring the force into direct conflict with a party to the conflict. The Israeli Defence Forces have shown complete disregard for the safety of UN peacekeepers in the past and there is no reason to assume that this will change in the future.
Will such a force have a responsibility to protect civilians? This is one of the most controversial developments in peace-support operations in recent years. The UN does not have the political or military clout to prevent Israeli air, naval and artillery attacks on Lebanon. If Israel cannot stop Hizbullah continuing rocket attacks on Israel, how is it hoped that a UN force can do so?
A worst-case scenario is the presence of an emasculated international force while Israeli forces and Hizbullah continue their reign of terror on the civilians of Lebanon and Israel respectively. An unfortunate consequence of the focus on the Middle East right now is that attention is being deflected from the equally serious humanitarian catastrophe taking place in Darfur and elsewhere.
• Dr Ray Murphy is director of the LLM programme in International Peace Support Operations, Irish Centre for Human Rights, NUI Galway. He served as a captain with the Irish contingent with Unifil during 1981/82 and in 1989.