"What on earth did they think they were signing up to?" Chris Patten could not conceal his exasperation last week when he was asked to comment on the Ulster Unionist reaction to his review on policing. He made the point that he and his colleagues had been given detailed terms of reference in the Belfast Agreement and that these included putting forward proposals on such issues as "culture, ethos and symbols."
The same question could also be asked about the agreement in toto, and where we go from here if the parties find they cannot implement the terms to which they signed up on Good Friday last year. For the bitter divisions over the Patten report go right to the heart of the political argument over the agreement.
At one level, the anger over the proposal to change the name of the RUC reflects the grief which many victims of republican violence still suffer. They feel, quite genuinely, that any change to the title and insignia of the force diminishes the value placed on the sacrifices made by police families over the past 30 years.
Last weekend I was told by police officers that 95 per cent of the Patten report would be acceptable to most members of the force, but that the change of name obscured the good sense of the bulk of the proposals. Perhaps, if it were possible to offer some comfort on this issue, much of the anger directed at the Patten report from within the RUC might be soothed away.
In the broader context, though, reactions to the report mirror the continuing conflict of views over what the Belfast Agreement means to the two communities. Unionists who voted Yes in May last year believed that in signing up to the accord Irish nationalists, north and south, now accepted the legitimacy of the northern state.
The principle of consent ensured that constitutional change could come about only if and when a majority in Northern Ireland agreed to it. Northern nationalists, including the republican community represented by Sinn Fein, would be given a role in the running of government. In return, they would work within the structures of the state and accept its symbols.
As Chris Patten pointed out when his report was published, one of the most important lessons he and his colleagues learnt, during the course of 40 public meetings, is that there are two stories of pain in Northern Ireland. As a result of widespread experience, the nationalist community does not see the RUC in the same light as unionists. They have also had, from the beginning, a very different view of the Belfast Agreement. The nationalist community, including those represented by Sinn Fein, saw it as having the potential to create a neutral space in which both political traditions would be accorded equal legitimacy and respect.
Unionists would have the opportunity to persuade Catholics that they could have equality within the state, a challenge implicitly accepted by David Trimble in the speech he made after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. Nationalists could pursue, by political means, the aspiration to a united Ireland. Sinn Fein has repeatedly explained that it sees the agreement as proving a means of "managing" the period of transition.
The republican leadership points to demographic changes and argues that progress towards unity is only a matter of time. Soon after the agreement was signed a senior member of Sinn Fein told me that the task now was to bring about a transformation in political relations in the North in the intervening period. If the violence continued, then the danger would be that a nationalist majority could emerge only to be confronted with an angry and frightened unionist minority. The agreement, if it worked, could provide structures that would allow the two communities to learn to work together, and would also build much closer links with this State.
Sinn Fein, as I understand it, remains committed to making the agreement work. The party argues that it is entitled, as of right, to seats on the executive and that decommissioning has been used by unionists as a stratagem to prevent this happening. But if the immediate problems are not resolved, and the executive is not set up, Sinn Fein has a much more coherent fallback position than it is possible to detect among the various strands of unionism.
There is no evidence of a desire for the IRA to return to violence, at least in the short term. The next logical step for Gerry Adams, should the agreement collapse, will be to campaign for joint authority. Sinn Fein will be able to argue that it has now proved impossible to set up devolved structures of government in Northern Ireland but that the agreement specifically recognises "the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose".
Despite the depressing events of the summer, David Trimble must recognise this possibility. The unionist leader knows the Belfast Agreement offers his community an equitable way forward. If his party responds to the political challenge, it may even be able to convince a sizeable part of the Catholic community that their best hope for the future lies in a continuation of the union with Britain.
The very real political tensions of the marching season, combined with the imposition of an unrealistic deadline, meant David Trimble was unable to lead his party into an executive in July. The events of the summer, particularly the apparent defection of John Taylor to the No camp, have made his present negotiating position even more difficult. But the political realities remain unchanged. The Belfast Agreement was signed as the result of long and difficult negotiations. The main political parties in Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments signed up to making it work. The people of both parts of this island voted for it.
If it proves impossible to resolve the present difficulties by setting up devolved political structures, there will be an onerous responsibility on both governments, jointly, to honour the commitment contained in the agreement to "partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands."
Whatever Plan B turns out to contain, it is extremely unlikely to be any more attractive to those unionists who have opposed the Belfast Agreement than Plan A. David Trimble knows this, but needs to impress the point on his wavering supporters.