Scotland is firmly embarked on a process of political devolution, leaving a huge question-mark over what this implies for its longer-term future: whether it will remain a constituent element of a more-or-less federal United Kingdom, or will eventually move beyond that to independence within the European Union.
Only one thing is certain: the Scottish National Party and the British Labour Party cannot both be right in their interpretation of the long-term significance of Thursday's emphatic vote.
The Scottish question has a particular fascination for us in Ireland. But our experience of independence has an even greater fascination for many Scots, especially in the light of our somewhat belated, but quite remarkable, emergence as a high growth economy.
The contrast between Irish and Scottish history of the past three centuries has always intrigued me. Whatever may have been the circumstances of the Union of 1707, and there were at least some dubious elements common to that event and to the later Union of Ireland and Britain, after the failure of successive rebellions in 1708, 1715 and 1745 Scotland seems to have settled down to a quite comfortable relationship with England in the second half of the 18th century. Factors helping to explain this include the fact that the two countries share one island; the common, albeit strongly differentiated, Protestantism of the two countries and the recognition of Presbyterianism as the Established Church of Scotland by the 1701 Act of Settlement; the successful development of industry in Scotland in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution; and Scotland's sense of partnership in the creation of the early British Empire. The contrast with Irish experience is blindingly obvious.
For both the religious differentiation between the two islands and the failure of Ireland to benefit from the Industrial Revolution strongly reinforced the sense of a very separate identity that we derived from living in a different island with a totally different cultural history.
In retrospect we can see that Irish independence was a logical, if perhaps not entirely inevitable, consequence of our history; whereas, in Scotland's case, the issue of its relationship with England has always been much less clear-cut.
That Scottish independence has recently re-emerged as a live issue has been due in part at least to the impact of UK membership of the European Union. Scotland's interests within the EU sometimes diverge from those of England, although not as frequently as in the case of the island of Ireland.
Yet, because the EU is a union of states, Scotland is necessarily represented there by a United Kingdom government which, when faced with a choice between the interests of England and those of Scotland, must necessarily come down in favour of the seven-eighths of the people of the island who live south of the border.
Of course, from time to time a UK government may seek some concession for Scotland. But in my experience there is always a certain reluctance to embark on such a course. True, in 1976 a British Foreign Secretary suggested that a concession (doubling the Irish fish catch in the face of cutbacks elsewhere) which I had just secured from the Commission, should be extended for the benefit of Scotland. But this was a bit transparent, as he represented Grimsby and wanted the entire UK and not just Scotland to be given this concession.
Earlier that year the British had also sought and secured two additional seats for Scotland and Wales in the European Parliament because we insisted that Northern Ireland be given a third seat to ensure representation of the nationalist minority. But when these extra seats were agreed by the European Council, bringing the representation of the UK as well as of the other three larger States up from 78 to 81, the British government then allocated both of them to England.
Concern not to provoke Scottish claims for special treatment has at times inhibited British governments from seeking differentiated EU provisions for Northern Ireland, or even from supporting proposals by Irish governments along these lines. This may yet prove a source of difficulty in the negotiations now about to start in Belfast.
For one of the proposals in the Framework Document presented by the two governments 21/2 years ago is that the North South body which it envisages should have an "important role . . . in developing on a continuing basis an agreed approach for the whole island in respect of the challenges and opportunities of the European Union [including] all programmes and initiatives to be implemented on a cross-border or island-wide basis in Ireland". And it also proposed that this body would "be responsible for . . . the implementation and management of EC policies and programmes on a joint basis".
Now, it would clearly make sense for a body developing programmes and initiatives for the island as a whole to be responsible for the negotiation of these matters in Brussels. The idea of such joint representation in Brussels in cases where the Northern Ireland administration believed that the area's interests coincided with those of this State, and diverged from those of Britain, has considerable support in the Northern Ireland business community.
It also has support within the civil service in Belfast, where, however, there is scepticism about our eventual willingness to share with Northern Ireland our sovereignty over this key aspect of our foreign policy. And I know that some politicians in the unionist parties would also be open to such a development at a later stage, if a settlement were to emerge which they felt secured Northern Ireland's position within the Union so long as that remains the wish of a majority there.
The eventual obstacle to such a radical development could, however, turn out to be British government fears that it could lead to a demand from the Scottish parliament for a similar arrangement. Such a concern could account for the curious fact that, in his address at the press conference announcing the Framework Document, John Major chose defensively to give priority to an emphatic reservation to the UK government of the representation of Northern Ireland in Brussels.
The recent extraordinary growth of the Irish economy has introduced a further twist to the tangled relationship between what used to be known as the three kingdoms. Scottish nationalists are clearly tempted to draw conclusions from our somewhat belated success in deploying our independence to economic advantage.
However, to the extent that high educational motivation and a non-specialised secondary education system are key elements in our success, Scotland already enjoys these advantages, even within the existing parliamentary union with England.
Where Scotland - and Northern Ireland - are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis our State is in being tied to a British taxation system which imposes much heavier taxation on industry, partly at least because of misplaced ideological conviction that low personal taxes are a greater incentive to economic growth than is low industrial taxation.
And there has always been great resistance in Britain and elsewhere to the idea of different levels of personal and business taxation being levied within the territory of a single sovereign state.
These are issues that could eventually create considerable tension between a Parliament at Westminster of an overwhelmingly English composition and a devolved Parliament in Edinburgh - and perhaps also one in Belfast.
The emergence of a dynamic Irish economy could have a positive effect on co-operation between our State and a peaceful Northern Ireland. But, in conjunction with some aspects of a transformed North-South relationship within this island, this dramatic development might also come to exert a measure of fissiparous influence within neighbouring Britain.
We need to be conscious of these new factors potentially affecting the already complex relationship between our two islands.
There has always been great resistance in Britain and elsewhere to the idea of different levels of personal and business taxation