WorldView:One hundred days on from the elections which brought them to power, the devolved administrations in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales are well installed and making political waves far beyond the expectations of those who feared the consequences of bringing separatist nationalists to power in the "Celtic fringe" of the United Kingdom, writes Paul Gillespie.
The highlight this week was Alex Salmond's publication of a White Paper, Choosing Scotland's Future, A National Conversation. Subtitled Independence and Responsibility in the Modern World, it lays out three possible courses: the status quo, in which many powers are devolved but crucial ones are reserved to Westminster; further devolution, leading to a federal system, albeit an asymmetrical one in which different regions of the UK would have variable autonomy from the centre and an independent Scotland, which would not necessarily be a republic, since a united monarchy could remain in place.
Salmond has been widely admired for the skill with which he first formed a minority administration after talks with the Liberal Democrats broke down on the issue of an independence referendum, and then for the subtlety and flair with which he has exercised power. According to Iain MacWhirter, political columnist for The Herald in Glasgow, Salmond has "the makings of Scotland's first great political leader in 300 years". He has shown "tactical genius and real political courage in the manner in which he has run an effective government in Scotland, with only 46 out of 129 MSPs and no coalition partner". MacWhirter is also proud of Gordon Brown's performance as prime minister and wonders how the two Scots will handle their polar opposite views on the UK's future.
A series of political initiatives has put flesh on Salmond's reputation, demonstrating his competence and ability to test and extend the limits of existing devolved powers in pursuit of his longer-term goal. They include decisions on Edinburgh's transport system; an end to private healthcare within the NHS; a climate change bill; a separate Scottish civil service; a "state" visit to Brussels, during which he said Scotland's relations with the EU will be transformed, proposals for more fiscal autonomy and for the revival of inter-regional negotiations between the UK's devolved administrations and Whitehall.
Salmond has also paid much attention to Ireland North and South. He has cultivated good relations with Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness during several visits to Belfast, developing potential joint approaches to London, notably on a differentiated corporation tax. The White Paper foresees closer relations with Dublin through the British-Irish Council (BIC), whose agenda Salmond wants to extend at a forthcoming summit meeting he will host. The document says the BIC "could provide a model for future co-operation across Britain and Ireland following independence for Scotland". Ireland's prosperity and confidence is an obvious inspiration for the SNP.
Paradoxically, the effect of all this activity has been to boost the SNP's popularity in opinion polls from 33 per cent at the elections to 48 per cent now, whereas support for independence has fallen from 48 per cent in January to 31 per cent now. As the Economist says, "this is perhaps because the voters who propelled the SNP to power in May were more concerned with ousting a tired Labour/Liberal Democrat ruling coalition than with overthrowing the constitution". It quotes James Mitchell of Strathclyde University: "The SNP didn't get into power because of support for independence. The public are way ahead of commentators in understanding that what is going on is a gradual, complex, multi-faceted process of change, not an event."
The central political point here is that Salmond has made the most of his limited victory by accepting that further devolution can be a stepping stone to independence, rather than an end in itself. Thus the White Paper opens with the celebrated quote from Parnell: "No man has a right to fix the boundary of the march of a nation; no man has a right to say to his country, 'thus far shalt thou go and no further'."
That is the meaning of the conversation involved. He has succeeded in shifting the political ground towards him following a joint statement issued by Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, rejecting independence but accepting that further devolution is on the agenda - even though Gordon Brown insisted earlier this year that the existing system is a settled agenda, an event not a process.
Salmond retains the right to determine the outcome of the conversation in deciding when to hold a referendum on independence and accepts it could be a two-option choice between that and deeper devolution. He rejects the suggestion that referendums should also be held elsewhere in the UK before independence would be negotiated. He accepts that the issue could be put to a vote only once in a generation, so timing will be central.
Reference to Parnell is apt, since historically, Ireland has been the consistent issue on which Anglo-British nationalism was constructed, whether at the time of the Act of Union or in the Home Rule crises of 1885-6 or 1911-14. As a result, unionism became indelibly associated with sectarian, triumphalist Protestant and imperial British ethno-nationalism for most of nationalist Ireland.
Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism is regarded in similar terms by metropolitan and regional unionists, in a confusing war of words about its civic and ethnic definitions. Salmond has consistently argued that civic nationalism represents Scotland's road to modernity. The evidence from Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales so far tends to bear out an observation by the historian Hugh Kearney in an essay published in 2000 on the future of Britishness, that "the Celtic fringe may sooner rather than later transform itself into a civic fringe".
With the English making up 85 per cent of the UK population, Englishness is challenged by these developments after the end of empire and the cold war. It lacks a distinctive purchase historically or culturally because until recently, it did not have to be asserted. In response to Scottish nationalism, there is a distinct reassertion of English identity. If it is pushed too far, it will bolster Salmond's case for independence. That would affect Ireland profoundly if it came to pass. It is a political mistake, therefore, to disregard the effects of a changing Britain on East-West relations when we pay closer attention to North-South ones in Ireland.