The Irish Times debate: Convention on the Future of Europe. . . Yes says Ben Tonra of UCD, No argues Aengus Ó Snodaigh of Sinn Féin
Vetoes defend bullies and the bloody-minded. Real politics - whether in Dublin or Brussels - is best served by negotiation, by finding common ground with those who disagree with you and by pursuing shared interests with like-minded partners.
If vetoes rule, stagnation results. Over the last 30 years of our EU membership, it is possible to count on the single finger of one hand the number of times a unilateral Irish veto has served Irish interests well. By contrast, there are many examples where policies of special importance to Ireland have been lost due to the self-interested vetoes of others.
There is a myth that the veto offers smaller states some degree of policy control. Nothing could be further from the truth. In the field of foreign policy, as elsewhere, vetoes overwhelmingly serve the interests of the status quo.
Politicians can sit by and watch a painful foreign policy consensus emerge on - let's say - a brutal violation of human rights, but if that consensus fails to serve their immediate self-interest they are free - with the wave of a well-manicured ministerial hand - to dismiss the will of an overwhelming majority of Europeans.
It is also too often implied that Irish foreign policy makers in Brussels are like lone sheriffs in a diplomatic wild west dominated by the (formerly) great European powers and their imperial pasts. Again, the reality is far different.
The majority of states within the European Union - and overwhelmingly so following enlargement - will be small to middling states with their own proud records of peacekeeping.
Many already have far better records than Ireland in development co-operation and in support for human rights and all have at least as strong a commitment to the United Nations. A truly common common foreign and security policy would better reflect these values and interests.
Today, when unanimity within a common foreign and security policy is lacking and the veto applies, it means that states are "free" to do their own thing. The problem with this, of course, is that this "freedom" is far more significant to larger states than to smaller ones. The larger states have wide-ranging global interests and often face a genuine conflict between self-interest and more abstract ethical values.
When their self-interest is "freed" from the restrictions of a common foreign and security policy, they also have recourse to powerful diplomatic, economic and military capacities. Smaller states such as Ireland have then only the freedom to complain and to condemn but no real capacity for change or for influence.
EU foreign policy discussions rarely line up as simply as "small versus large", since interests and values vary among states. It would, however, be true to say in general that smaller states tend to be more supportive of the rule of law over the law of force simply because they have little force at their disposal. They tend also to place a premium on international law and institutions such as the UN.
Losing the veto in the common foreign and security policy and creating a truly common foreign policy would thus contribute to a European Union that had the capacity to act like a large state, but which thought more like a small state. This is an attractive combination from both an Irish and European perspective.
Dr Ben Tonra is deputy director of the Dublin European Institute, UCD, and joint editor, with Dr Eilis Ward, of Ireland in International Affairs: Interests, Institutions and Identities, IPA Dublin, 2002.
Irish people are rightly proud of this State's unique track record in international relations, with its emphasis on neutrality, UN primacy, peacekeeping, and solidarity with our decolonising neighbours in the southern hemisphere. We believe in the integrity and positive potential of these policies, and that is why over 100,000 people recently took to the streets in their defence.
Irish foreign policy evolved from our specific experience as a colonised European nation, dragged into imperialist wars against our interests and against our will. It must therefore come as no surprise that republicans insist on full independence in Irish foreign policy, as one of the recognised cornerstones of national sovereignty. That is our historic position, and it complements our belief in positive neutrality and international solidarity.
The fact is that Ireland does not exercise full independence in its foreign policy. Foreign policy is not one of the devolved areas of government in the six counties under the Good Friday agreement. Britain retains control. In the 26 counties, as the Taoiseach and Tánaiste have recently admitted, foreign policy is subject to influence by foreign investors who can pay the right price for co-operation.
In addition, successive EU treaties since Maastricht have steadily eroded the remaining independence in foreign policy in this State.
Ireland now "pools sovereignty" with other EU member states in a Common Foreign and Security Policy. In practice, most decisions are made unanimously, and EU member-states still have an absolute right of veto over decisions with military and defence implications. But there is now pressure to scrap this veto on the basis that it acts as a hindrance to securing agreement among the states.
While it is true that it can be used as a bulwark against decisions that run counter to a member-state's national interest, the veto can also be used positively to ensure collective decisions endorsed by all. What the "veto" really represents is a requirement for unanimity or consensus in decision-making.
The European Convention Working Group on Defence proposes to do away with the present consensus requirement on defence matters in favour of "constructive abstention" - a euphemism for "co-operate or keep quiet". It also proposes to make "enhanced co-operation" an option, so militarily reticent states can be sidelined if necessary - a euphemism for "get out of our way".
As a result, Ireland must decide whether we will agree to give up to the EU what limited independence we can still exercise in this crucial policy area.
This debate is not taking place in a vacuum, but in the context of a steadily militarising EU, and increased convergence between the EU and NATO.
The Convention Working Group on Defence proposes the creation of a "Defence Euro-Zone" with both an internal defence role and "peacemaking" or military attack capabilities, and an EU military-industrial complex to support it. EU defence policy would be directed by a high-level representative and a military committee - all unelected.
If we retain the veto, Ireland could still act as a brake on this accelerating process of militarisation. If not, this is our future.
If anything, republicans want independence in Irish foreign policy increased. Retaining unanimity (the veto) is the minimum necessary if we want to protect and strengthen Irish neutrality and policy independence. If we fail in this, the as-yet-untapped potential of positive neutrality in action may never be realised.
Aengus Ó Snodaigh TD is Sinn Féin spokesperson on International Affairs
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Next week: Does the EU need a constitutional treaty? Pat Cox v John Rogers