Over the next three weeks fateful decisions will have to be made about the Kosovo crisis and how NATO's war against Serbia is to be prosecuted. The two month bombing campaign has severely damaged Serbia's military and civilian infrastructure, but it has not forced that state to accept NATO's terms for a settlement, despite signs from the Milosevic regime that it wants to negotiate. Decisions have now been made to put some 50,000 NATO troops into the region to form the core of an implementation force if an agreement is reached in time to oversee the return of the refugees before winter sets in - or, if it is not and within the same time span, as the core of a ground assault force. The decision of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to indict President Slobodan Milosevic and four other Serb leaders on war crimes charges complicates both the diplomacy and the military preparations.
It has been clear for many weeks that troops would have to be deployed in either scenario, but there has been a great reluctance by political leaders to commit them. That would require a deeper engagement with public opinion in NATO states and a readiness to contemplate substantial military casualties. Instead the air war has been prosecuted as if it could achieve NATO's war aims on its own, with minimal loss of pilots' lives. After two months it has been shown that this is not so.
It is not only armchair strategists but many experienced military experts who say such a policy should have been followed from much earlier on in the conflict, since it would have added pressure and uncertainty on Mr Milosevic. Troop deployment could also have dissuaded him from the foul campaign of expulsions, the victims of which continue to stream out of Kosovo. Their safe return must be a primary objective of diplomacy and military action. But the disjunction between NATO's ambitious ends and limited means has made it much more difficult to achieve.
Divisions have emerged within the alliance on the use of ground troops in any offensive action, as distinct from forming the core of an implementation force. In the circumstances it makes strong political sense to prepare their deployment and simultaneously to intensify the search for a diplomatic settlement. The proposals put forward by the German and Italian governments call for including the Russians centrally in a move to get Security Council approval for an agreement to return the refugees to their homes. A pause in the bombing campaign would be related directly to verifiable Serbian troop withdrawals from Kosovo and the subsequent negotiation of a political settlement.
Orchestrating such an approach is an increasingly urgent task. Demands from the British government for an outright victory over Serbia are not supported fully in Washington or by other NATO allies and do not sit easily with the ambiguity over the use of ground troops to enforce it. There is surely room for an honourable agreement which would avoid a prolonged conflict and devote maximum energies to rebuilding the Balkan region that has been so damaged by this appalling conflict. It would be one thing to deal with Mr Milosevic in reaching an agreement, quite another to extend aid to him now that he has been indicted for war crimes.