The Prize Of Peace

There have been other false dawns in Northern Ireland

There have been other false dawns in Northern Ireland. The hopes expressed at the time of the last ceasefire in August, 1994, were to be crushed at Canary Wharf, in Lurgan, Bessbrook and elsewhere. The announcement of the second ceasefire - in time to allow Sinn Fein take its place at the all-party talks - will, no doubt, prompt fears that the violence could return if the political climate becomes less propitious for Sinn Fein. But, even against this background, it would be churlish not to welcome the expected announcement from the IRA; all people of goodwill on this island have gained new grounds for believing that the normality of peace could yet replace the dreadful fear of random killing on the streets. A second ceasefire clearly has the potential to transform the prospects for the Stormont talks, notwithstanding Mr Trimble's continuing difficulties with the decommissioning issue and the dilemma that this presents for both governments. A restoration of the ceasefire would see the Provisionals turning their face against the calculated, sectarianism of Lurgan and elsewhere. Critically, it would confirm that the violent irredentism of the hard men has not been allowed to take root; that those who make the case for peace have held sway.

The IRA's campaign of violence was becoming increasingly untenable. One-by-one, each of the means that Sinn Fein employed to prevaricate since Canary Wharf, was removed as both Dublin and London moved to assuage republican concerns about the talks process. The IRA was left with a stark choice; an opportunity to allow Sinn Fein take its place at the negotiating table - and build its support on both sides of the border - or the continuation of a futile military campaign.

The role of both the Major and Bruton administrations in helping to rebuild the peace must not be understated. But few would dispute that the election of Mr Ahern and Mr Blair, has helped to transform the situation. Mr Ahern's unequivocal commitment to the nationalist people of the North since his election - the sense that he was prepared to act as the guarantor of their rights in any negotiations - has helped to make the case for a ceasefire inside the IRA. For their part, Mr Blair and Dr Mowlam, unencumbered by the problems of parliamentary arithmetic that beset Mr Major, have demonstrated courage, resolution and singlemindedness. The strong, indefatigable optimism of Senator George Mitchell and his team, even during very bleak periods, also helped to generate momentum. Most of all, the immense contribution of Mr Hume and Mr Adams in making the case for peace, must be recognised.

But it must be remembered that another ceasefire is merely a beginning, a second chance to build a durable peace process. In the run-in to next Wednesday's deadline for agreement on decommissioning, a great deal now rests on the courage and political leadership of Mr David Trimble, who refused to accept the joint British-Irish paper. With both governments making it abundantly clear yesterday that they will not allow the agreement on decommissioning to unravel, a heavy responsibility now rests with Mr Trimble. He can seize the opportunity to mould and shape the future of Northern Ireland or he can remain aloof as the two governments press on - as assuredly they will - with the peace process. A still heavier sense of responsibility rests with the Provisionals. The terms of the expected ceasefire statement must be generous and open-minded. The Provisionals must signal their complete acceptance of the political process. There can be no more punishment shooting, no more dummy runs, no more intelligence gathering operations. There must be no more false dawns.