It's been a cliche of the peace process - one I used myself only last week - that the key elements of a settlement for Northern Ireland could be written by any politically-literate person on the back of a postage stamp.
This week's proposals from the British and Irish governments, entitled "Propositions on Heads of Agreement", occupy a little more space, but not very much. The document itself took up 68 lines in this newspaper. The accompanying joint statement ran to another 72. They are clearly intended to be read in tandem, for one complements the other. Even so, the two together would fit easily into the space occupied by this column with a bit of room to spare.
The fact that the proposals have been treated with such hype in the British media has provoked - understandably - a certain degree of cynicism here. Banner headlines like "IRELAND - THERE IS A SOLUTION" tend to draw a weary "Tell me about it" from those of us who have been around this course for some time.
But these two brief documents are of enormous importance. The hope is that they will concentrate the minds of all those involved in the talks at Stormont and enable the parties to cut a deal.
The date now being talked about is the end of March, well clear of the start of the Orange marching season in the North. Given the history of the talks to date, this timescale is breathtaking and signals a new determination on the part of both governments in acting jointly to move the situation forward. Not before time, some might say.
Much emphasis has been placed on the fact that the Propositions on Heads of Agreement are exactly what they say, proposals that need to be discussed, elucidated, considered in detail. But if the participants in the talks cannot "collectively generate a broad understanding of the key elements of a settlement", and proceed to the negotiations on the specifics necessary to achieve it, then it will be back to the two governments.
We now have, in black and white, what Dublin and London see as the shape of a settlement, and one which should be capable of commanding support in referendums in both parts of the island. For that reason, the proposals merit the widest possible public debate. At the very least, the two governments should consider printing the two brief documents in a leaflet and making them available in post offices and other public buildings, as has been done in the past.
The first reaction of politicians in the North has been mixed. For many people on this island David Trimble's broad grin and the grim demeanour of Mitchel McLaughlin will be the images that tell the story of this week. Already, the proposals are seen as heavily tilted towards the unionists.
The two governments must carry a large share of the blame for this state of affairs. The circumstances in which the documents were published have inevitably provoked suspicions that this latest initiative is primarily designed to pacify the loyalist parties.
By all accounts the last couple of weeks, and particularly the days leading to Monday's announcement, have seen a frenzy of diplomatic activity and phone lines buzzing between Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair. But why wasn't this done sooner? It was evident before the talks broke up for Christmas that a crisis was blowing up within unionism.
The loyalist parties were in deep trouble over the release of prisoners and the increasingly widespread view that they were getting nothing from the peace process. Pressures were mounting on David Trimble from members of his own party. Far from the two governments acting together to defuse the situation, the talks broke up, and Dublin took unilateral action and went ahead with the release of IRA prisoners.
Now, because of all that has happened in the intervening period, Gerry Adams has been presented with a crisis of confidence in his judgment that should have been avoidable. The nationalist community, particularly those members who live in the areas represented by Sinn Fein, is bruised and very frightened. The murders of innocent Catholics, suspicions that the RUC is not telling the truth about who is responsible, Mo Mowlam's visit to the Maze have all reawakened the old suspicions that the British government will always bow to the Orange card.
Many of these perceptions are simply a mirror-image of what unionists have been feeling about the whole peace process being a "stream of concessions to the IRA". But this simply underlines the need for both governments to deal sensitively with the fears of both communities.
The situation on the ground cannot be separated from the peace process. The enormous turnout for the funeral of Terry Enright yesterday was an act of mourning for a good and gentle man. But it was also a political demonstration by the nationalist community to show that it will not allow itself to be beaten back by loyalist violence from consolidating the gains it has made.
This anger and fear in his own community is part of the political problem which now faces Gerry Adams. Sinn Fein has reacted angrily to the Propositions for Heads of Agreement, arguing that they constitute a pulling back from the Framework Documents.
Examining the text of the two documents carefully, it seems to me that there is a high degree of fudge, but that nothing of real import has been jettisoned. Certain words, notably the use of "executive powers" to describe the cross-Border bodies, have been omitted or changed, but the "postage stamp" elements are all still there.
What does seem to be the case, however, is that both governments have taken a calculated decision that their priority at the moment is to keep David Trimble in the talks and to steady the loyalist parties.
Nobody in their right mind would argue with that. Trimble is crucial to any hope of success for the talks, and a great deal of time and effort has already been devoted to building up his confidence. If the developments of this week mean that the Ulster Unionist leader at last agrees to talk directly to Sinn Fein, that will be a significant and hugely helpful development.
At the moment the situation appears to favour David Trimble, while Gerry Adams and those close to him have serious difficulties in reassuring their own supporters. If one thing is sure about the situation in Northern Ireland, it is that this will change. The barometer will swing the other way and back again.
But, as the negotiations grow more intensive and the threat of renewed violence from dissident groups looms in the background, it must be the task of both governments to ensure that the political temperature on the ground remains relatively calm.
That is what confidence-building means.