WORLD VIEW:THE GOVERNMENT will put the elements of its plan to resolve the Lisbon dilemma next month to the European Council, writes PAUL GILLESPIE
It will deal with whether to hold another referendum, what its terms would be and when to vote. Debate on the issue is intensifying ahead of that - a good thing given the grave issues at stake for Ireland's future in the European Union. Interest is mounting in the other member states and around the world as demand grows for a stronger EU to handle global economic and political crises.
A notable finding of the Irish Times/TNSmrbi poll on Lisbon this week was a reduction in the "don't know" responses to 18 per cent compared with the 30 per cent levels in a poll a week before the referendum. Political argument and radically changed circumstances may be combining to reduce the large numbers of those who pleaded lack of understanding, knowledge or information as their reasons for abstaining or voting No in June.
A pro-treaty swing among middle-class voters, farmers and some younger voters is offset by continuing working-class, female and 18-24-year-old opposition.
This was in response to a hypothetical package on retaining a commissioner for every state - not necessarily an easy step to sell - and clarifying Irish concerns on neutrality, abortion and taxation in special declarations. Assuming the Government decides another referendum should be held, this is the most minimal position that could be put. Critics were quick to say it would leave the treaty unchanged, since declarations, unlike protocols, are not legally binding and the commissioner decision would be made unanimously by the European Council if Ireland ratifies.
For this reason, the Green Party advocates a Danish approach in which political declarations are registered as international treaties at the United Nations to give them legal certainty. In Denmark, after the No vote to the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992, these were expressed as opt-outs from: the euro; EU citizenship; the common defence policy; supranational judicial co-operation on asylum, immigration and civil law; and elements of visa co-operation. The treaty was left unchanged but Denmark subtracted itself from participation in these spheres.
In a useful analysis of this and other options on Lisbon, the Institute for International and European Affairs (IIEA) (http://www.iiea.com/files/ Lisbon.pdf) points out that the Danish opt-outs were agreed on a cross-party basis at national level first and then put to the European Council. The Danish parliament concluded in 2003 that, on the defence opt-out, Danish freedom of action was limited more than its autonomy gained because participation is voluntary and there is a loss of veto rights.
The Danish case is relevant as to method and substance. There is a hint in the Green approach that declarations will not be sufficient to convince voters that Irish neutrality is protected from erosion as we participate in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, notwithstanding voluntary and veto rights. The party may seek either a comprehensive opt-out from the EU's defence arrangements, or a more limited one from the European Defence Agency unanimously agreed by the European Council in 2004 and now given a treaty base.
A comprehensive opt-out would not be cost-free, the IIEA argues. It would preclude Defence Forces participating in the joint staff work, training and actual operations which currently define much of their professional profile and which has contributed significantly to EU-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Chad and the Congo. It should be remembered that the UN is relying more and more on regional organisations like the EU to conduct such operations. There would be a real loss of influence on the development of EU policies in this area because of non-participation and loss of veto rights. And Ireland's foreign policy credibility would diminish because of this withdrawal.
A more limited opt-out from the European Defence Agency would have less impact. This is intended to streamline military capacities and eliminate duplication, but it is voluntary. This option could prove attractive to the Greens as a concrete measure, may find pragmatic favour with Fianna Fáil and possibly Labour, but would be strongly opposed by Fine Gael. It falls to the very active and effective Oireachtas subcommittee on Ireland's future in the EU to recommend measures to the Government by the end of this month. Decisions will have to be taken in December, so this badly needs more public debate.
Speaking with the Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb to a group of students from UCD's Dublin European Institute this week, Micheál Martin underlined how prominent the defence issue is among voter concerns (and especially among women), as revealed by research done after the referendum. It is a priority for Yes and No voters. Stubb explained that neutrality is not a problem in Finland, where there was cross-party agreement to redefine the issue as a non-aligned policy after joining the EU in 1996. He says this is protected in the EU treaties.
Stubb is an important and much-needed ally of Ireland's in this crisis. A specialist in EU affairs before becoming a minister, he defined the EU's purposes as pursuing peace, prosperity, security and stability. He is strongly against the idea of a core group within the EU, saying it would be dominated by the large states; by contrast, the smaller ones benefit from strong common institutions.
Stubb mentioned welfare as a possible fifth purpose of the EU. That raises another issue, workers' rights, which is also a major concern of voters. If nothing is done on that subject in any second referendum, working-class opposition to the treaty may be undiminished.