The elaborate United Nations resolution which brokered a cessation of hostilities between Israel, Lebanon and the Hizbullah resistance movement last weekend was based on deployment of a new international force within two weeks of its passage.
This crucial component of the deal is now in danger of unravelling because of a failure to agree detailed rules of operational engagement. France, to the fore in the diplomacy, has astonished all involved with a paltry offer of 200 troops for the force, instead of the 7,000 to 8,000 expected. It is not surprising that states such as Ireland are cautious about making precise commitments in this climate of uncertainty.
The war's ambiguous military outcome gives rise to this problem, which in turn is reflected in the difficulty of defining what precise role the UN force will have. The resolution asks UN soldiers to "accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces" in establishing the zone, which is to be "free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons". It falls to the Lebanese army to ensure that this task is accomplished. But what if it fails to do so, or if the effort goes wrong? Will it then fall to the UN force to back up the admittedly weak Lebanese troops? And will they come into open confrontation with Hizbullah?
In a war with the objective of destroying Hizbullah and eliminating its military threat to northern Israel, Israeli leaders have had to settle for much less. Hizbullah has proclaimed a victory by mere survival against such an onslaught. Its leadership says it will not be disarmed, notwithstanding that its two ministers went along with the cabinet decision to deploy the Lebanese army below the Litani river for the first time. In a bold political initiative Hizbullah is leading reconstruction efforts, using Iranian funds. The Lebanese president admits there is no prospect that the army will search out arms caches, but at the most try to ensure arms are not paraded openly there.
For the UN force to succeed it badly needs what Irish military planners aptly refer to as an anchor tenant on whom other participants can rely for sustained commitment and leadership. France appeared to be assuming that role through its forward diplomacy on Resolution 1701, along with the US. Should it now fail to back that up with a realistic troop commitment, the ceasefire looks precarious. France says it wants a clearer mandate before committing more soldiers. Memories of blows struck against its troops in Lebanon in the early 1980s, and rancorous ill-feeling between President Chirac and President Assad of Syria, are strong factors in this rethink. But these should have been foreseen before now.
Other states, including Ireland, will take time to adjust to these new realities. Ireland's potential contribution is small because of other UN commitments. But there is real expertise and good will available, following our long term service in Unifil. That will be useful in attempting to achieve the pressing political need to make the ceasefire stick. However, Irish involvement should be based on clear and realistic rules of engagement.