It is hard to be optimistic about the UN resolution on Lebanon, writes Noel Dorr
The resolution on Lebanon before the UN Security Council is positive in one respect: it calls for a full cessation of hostilities based on an immediate cessation of Hizbullah attacks and offensive military operations by Israel. With 1,000 dead and appalling destruction in Lebanon, nearly 100 dead in Israel, and conflict escalating, it is long past time for such a call from the UN body with authority for international peace and security.
The fact that the US joined France in such a proposal is also positive to a degree because US engagement is a necessary condition of progress towards a settlement. At a minimum, it means the US has moved on from its earlier refusal to call for a ceasefire - an approach which seemed designed to buy time for Israel to crush Hizbullah.
In other respects, however, the draft is inadequate, even seriously flawed. It may be amended under pressure from Lebanon and other Arab countries - though probably not substantially. If passed as it stands, I sincerely hope it will halt the killing and lay out a path to peace. But it is difficult to be optimistic.
The draft resolution has five other main elements.
• It calls on Lebanon and Israel to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on nine principles. These include fixing Lebanese borders in disputed areas; extension of the authority of the Lebanese government to all parts of Lebanon; and disarmament of all other groups.
• It asks UN secretary general Kofi Annan to help in getting both governments to accept these principles. He is also to develop proposals for the Security Council within 30 days on delineating Lebanon's borders and implementing earlier council resolutions on disarming militias in southern Lebanon.
• If both governments accept the nine principles, and "subject to their approval", the council will adopt a further resolution authorising a UN mandated international force to help Lebanese forces maintain security and contribute to a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution. This further resolution, unlike the present text, will invoke the council's enforcement powers under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.
• When hostilities cease, Unifil, the 2,000-strong UN peacekeeping force, established in 1978, which still includes some Irish officers, will monitor implementation and help with humanitarian access and the return of displaced persons. It will also, "conditions permitting", help the Lebanese government at its request, to stop unlawful arms importation into Lebanon.
• Finally, the UN secretary general is to report within a week on implementation of the resolution.
Much of this is positive. But more important than what the draft says, is what it does not say. Since there is no mention of a withdrawal of Israeli forces, the implication is that they may remain in Lebanon until the new international force arrives. At best, that will take weeks, not days; and so long as they are there, Hizbullah will probably continue the conflict. If that happens, Israel will strike back hard and argue that the resolution relates only to offensive military operations.
The proposal for an international "stabilisation force" may raise its own difficulties. To be effective, it must be large and well-armed and have authority to act forcefully.
Unlike Unifil, its role will be enforcement, not peacekeeping. Will it be expected to suppress Hizbullah - something Israel seems unable to do ? Where will it deploy - in the south only, or elsewhere in Hizbullah strongholds, such as the Bekaa valley and the Syrian border ? Will it then be seen as an occupation force, aligned with Israel in practice, and thus subject to attack ?
The resolution's sponsors will say its role will simply be to help Lebanese forces extend the authority of the lawful government to all of Lebanon.
They will point out, rightly, that the resolution is predicated on the principle that the authority of any government should extend to all of its territory and that other armed groups should be disarmed. This principle is valid. But it does not take sufficient account of the realities of Lebanon and the region.
Lebanon is chronically weak, its population a patchwork quilt of disparate elements and religious groups. It endured 15 or more years of civil war, followed by years of Syrian domination.
Last year its popular prime minister, who restored the country's economy and infrastructure, was assassinated. Hizbullah, a militia and welfare organisation with support among the substantial Shia Muslim minority, is indigenous to Lebanon, a part of its complex political mix. It makes its own decisions even though it is supported and armed by Iran and Syria. Its stand has won it support although some other Lebanese blame it for the ferocious revenge exacted by Israel.
So far, it has been damaged but not destroyed. Can a peace plan which ignores Hizbullah, and rests solely on the valid principle that a government should be sovereign throughout its territory, now be successful ?
Perhaps it can. The Lebanese prime minister proposes to deploy 15,000 Lebanese troops to the south to extend his government's control there - something no previous government could do for decades.
He must believe he can do this without endangering Lebanon's fragile unity and again provoking civil war. Israel's prime minister finds the proposal "interesting". Intensive negotiation in New York may yet find a way forward - through "sequencing" or co-ordinating the entry of Lebanese and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
But even the best resolution on its own is unlikely to resolve truly fundamental issues. What is needed, in parallel, but sadly missing in recent years, is serious engagement by both the US and Europe with the problems of a volatile region which is vitally important to both. But it must be a balanced engagement.
The immediate issue is the war between Israel and Hizbullah. Neither recognises the other; neither has won; neither seems capable of stopping. The draft resolution may work - but as it stands it seems inadequate. What if, in parallel with UN action, President Bush were to send two respected envoys - say James Baker and George Mitchell - to the region as Ralph Nader recently proposed? What if, in addition, two countries - Syria and Iran - which can influence Hizbullah were drawn into serious dialogue? Each has much to gain from negotiation: Syria wants to recover the Golan Heights after decades of Israeli occupation; Iran to escape the sanctions it may face at the end of August.
But Lebanon is only part of an enormously complex pattern. At its centre is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - the original festering sore which spreads infection throughout the region and beyond. As in any deep-seated conflict, there is no easy way forward. Assigning blame depends on where you start: the politics of the last atrocity always makes things worse. It is necessary to start to wind the spiral downwards. This may require strong outside pressure on both sides.
But that requires a genuine, concerned engagement, sadly lacking now for many years. Instead the US, the one country which could have carried real weight in the region, sees everything through the distorting lens of the "war on terror" where those not with it are against it. This is not only simplistic and inadequate - it could be very dangerous if it were to turn the fantasy of an "arc of extremism", which Tony Blair evoked in a recent speech, into reality.
• Noel Dorr is a former Irish ambassador to the UN, and is a member of the Irish Times Trust