Diplomacy, amongst other things, is the art of presenting oneself as perpetually on the winning side - an essential part of Ambrose Bierce's definition: "The patriotic art of lying for one's country". A stern realism underlies such established codes of practice. National interests are assumed to be served by policies that succeed, just as are individual diplomatic careers. In the light of these realities the decision of the former United States Ambassador to the Court of St James, Mr Raymond Seitz, to go public with his scathing criticisms of his former colleague, the US Ambassador to Ireland, Mrs Jean Kennedy Smith, and of President Clinton has puzzled many people on both sides of the Atlantic, both as to substance and timing. He accuses them of breaching long-standing US opposition to terrorism when the decision was made in February 1994 to grant a visa to the president of Sinn Fein, Mr Gerry Adams. It is presented as a capitulation to the Irish-American lobby by a gullible and amateurish White House, an ambassador "too shallow to understand the past and to naive to anticipate the future" and an egregious and damaging blow to the Anglo-American special relationship. He even accuses White House personnel of passing on iintelligence to the IRA.
In the extracts from his autobiography published in the Sunday Telegraph Mr Seitz says "the quid for the Adams visa never produced its quo", in that Mr Adams never renounced terrorism, demanded and got more concessions and saw his stature "immeasurably enhanced" in Washington. He plays down the IRA ceasefire of August 1994 and the current one accompanying the political negotiations as merely tactical.
Mrs Kennedy Smith's dignified response is appropriately low-key, but nonetheless to the point. "Let the peace process speak for itself. The fact is that the party talks are under way and the outlines of a potential settlement are being discussed. The parties themselves have taken primary credit for this, but I think history will record that President Clinton and his administration have played a major part". As Mr Albert Reynolds has put it, "we had to prove that politics worked, worked better than violence and produced better results". The historical record shows that Mr Clinton made his important decision to grant the visa only after consulting a formidable range of political heavyweights in and around his administration. Mr Reynolds, Mr John Hume and other senior Irish representatives played a full part, as did his ambassador in Dublin, who herself was convinced the visa should be issued only after similar representations. The Major government came on board after the ceasefire, and so has its Labour successor.
In Washington, the administration has firmly supported Mrs Kennedy Smith and officials such as Mr Anthony Lake and Ms Nancy Soderberg who were maligned by Mr Seitz. Mr Lake has convincingly dismissed the allegation that British security information was passed to the IRA. In Dublin, it is pointed out that Mr Seitz was appointed by a Republican president, Mrs Kennedy Smith by a Democratic one. The London circles which Mr Seitz has made his own still harbour deep suspicion and hostility towards the Kennedy family. But Mrs Kennedy Smith has proved to be one of the most canny, effective and successful US ambassadors to Ireland. A final verdict on the US involvement (which has anyway always been more facilitating than mediating) will necessarily await the outcome of the peace process, now at probably its most sensitive moment. But from here Mr Seitz's criticisms look like those of someone who lost the argument and, ungraciously as well as undiplomatically, cannot forget that he did so.