The renewed intense fighting in Afghanistan suggests that the US and their Taliban and al-Qaeda enemies are all using guerrilla tactics. The US has learned from Vietnam and will not commit large numbers of troops, writes Tom Clonan.
"When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws" - Mao Tse Tsung on Guerrilla warfare
The US-led offensive in Paktia province in recent days is typical of non-conventional ground operations. The offensive bears the hallmarks of what the military refer to as a counter-insurgency, or COIN, operation. Up to 1,000 regular US troops from the 101st Airborne Division and the 10th Mountain Division are engaged in co-ordinated airborne attacks in an area of 60 sq km about 160 km south of Kabul.
The regular units involved in the current operations are in fact elite military formations. The 101st Airborne is especially suited to the highly mobile and fluid battlefield tactics necessary for the current phase of the war in Afghanistan.
Operating among a network of peaks and ridges ranging between 8,000 and 12,000 feet, the 10th Mountain Division is ideally suited to the terrain.
The choice of units deployed is also of enormous symbolic significance to the American people. The 101st Airborne is historically and traditionally among the first US military units committed to battle overseas. The 10th Mountain Division is based in Fort Drum, New York - the state so devastated by the September 11th attacks.
The tactics employed by the Americans in recent days have been to neutralise the target area with sustained aerial bombardment prior to close assault operations.
They have used a range of high-altitude bombs, including guided munitions and "thermobaric" weapons to clear the cave networks and natural defences occupied by re-grouped Taliban and al-Qaeda troops. With such terrain providing deep cover from air assault, the thermobaric device operates most effectively. Though invulnerable to blast and shrapnel, enemy troops are killed by shock wave - internal organs rupture and bones shatter.
After the aerial bombardment, the next phase of operations consists of the close assault. This is achieved by ferrying troops by helicopter into the combat area.
In this case, AC 130 Gunships and Apache helicopters have provided escort and security for the larger and slower troop carrying MH 47 Chinook helicopters. The Chinooks, as was the case in the Gulf War, have proven vulnerable to portable surface-to-air missiles and small-arms fire.
The mountainous terrain has confined these large helicopters to smaller landing zones, making them especially vulnerable to fire from surrounding peaks and ridgelines.
This was precisely the same problem faced by the Soviets deploying Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships during similar operations against the Mujahideen in Paktia in the mid 1980s.
Unlike the Soviets, however, the US is not attempting to hold ground. It is merely engaged in punitive counter-insurgency operations as the need arises.
After this offensive, the US will withdraw troops and await intelligence on the next concentration of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. The US can afford to be patient and engage in a longer-term strategy against al-Qaeda.
The Soviet Union spent between $15 billion and $30 billion on its occupation of Afghanistan and lost 15,000 troops in the process. The US, having learned the lessons of Vietnam, will be reluctant to commit large numbers of troops to Afghanistan.
It will instead fight an asymmetrical war, fully exploiting the technological superiority and mobility of its forces. Having spent over $60 billion on the Gulf War alone, the US can easily commit many billions of dollars on a war of attrition against the remainder of the al-Qaeda network and its Taliban supporters.
What we are seeing in Afghanistan is guerrilla warfare practised on both sides. The Taliban are employing the time-honoured guerrilla tactic of the past: disappearing into the hills, only to reappear and engage the enemy on difficult and unfavourable terrain.
The US is employing the 21st century guerrilla tactic of the superpower - employing satellite intelligence- gathering technology that makes it impossible for the enemy to disappear, and employing the type of military hardware that neutralises the disadvantages of difficult terrain.
The US may have suffered casualties in recent days, but its spectacular military success in Afghanistan to date has kept troop morale high and public support undiminished. If the present regime in Kabul can sustain order and deprive the Taliban of political support, the US may yet achieve its war aims in Afghanistan.
Dr Tom Clonan is a retired army Captain. He lectures in the political economy of communication at the Institute of Technology, Tallaght