Recent analysis shows what we all suspected – the banking crisis could not have happened without regulatory negligence, writes SARAH CAREY
MUCH OF the “Why? Why?” opinion on the Government’s banking policy underplays the influence of the institutions of the European Union. Sometimes this influence has been positive, sometimes negative, and sometimes it’s just too early to say.
Some blame the euro for all our ills. Low interest rates fuelled the credit bubble and now our inability to devalue hinders an export driven recovery. The low interest rates were a problem, but we used to have rules around mortgage lending. In the 1990s a couple could borrow just two and half times the higher earner’s income plus once the lower earner’s income. Somewhere along the line those regulations were abolished, forgotten or ignored and people “leveraged” their income to crazy levels. If we had stuck to the basics, we could have contained the bubble.
The divergence between strong and weak economies within the euro zone is a big problem and some suggest that monetary union may not survive the crisis. I’ll have to put that in the “too early to say” box. But it’s never too early to say there is safety in numbers.
If we were on our own, it’s quite feasible the dreaded “Iceland! Iceland!” scenario would have materialised. Linked informally to London or Frankfurt, we’d have created the bubble on our own and when it burst found ourselves a tiny currency in a global storm. Of course, life still goes on in Iceland, but I like the comfort of the liquidity provided by the ECB.
But what about the EU’s role in the banks? Interference seems to focus on two aspects – bank rescue and restructuring.
Brian Lenihan says in that fateful month of September 2008, Jean Claude Trichet, governor of the European Central Bank sent out a specific instruction: “Save your banks!” Easy for him to say when we’ve to pay for it.
Did that have to include Anglo? Across Europe there is evidence of a “no bank left behind” policy. It’s rooted in the cry – closely related to “Iceland! Iceland!” – namely “Lehmans! Lehmans!” The collapse of Lehmans led to what they call contagion, a paralysis of lending to all institutions, even sound ones. The prospect of a run on the banks seemed live then too. The ECB seemed determined to avoid that scenario in Europe.
Anyway, we did what we were told, though Trichet may not have liked our method. Would the collapse of Anglo have led to contagion? I’m not convinced that it would, but there is a known unknown that were it known, might help us decide.
We still don’t know the identity of Anglo’s bondholders or lenders. We do know that Irish Life and Permanent was propping them up in 2008. Who else? For all we know both AIB and the Bank of Ireland were in there. Or half the credit unions in the country. If it transpired that other Irish institutions would have been the direct victims of an Anglo collapse, then its rescue may have been unavoidable. It’s impossible to draw conclusions without this information.
Apart from the identity of these mysterious bondholders, senior and subordinated, there is also the question of whether or not we should play hardball with them. The general consensus is that while seniors aren’t generally trifled with, in theory we should get tough with the subordinated sort.
In practice, opinion is divided and we won’t know the Government’s true intentions until the guarantee expires in September. But precedents are rare, most notably when subordinated bondholders of Bradford and Bingley, a small building society in the UK – a non-euro country – were wiped out. With this sort of consistency, there is a smell of “no bondholder left behind” from the ECB too.
So are European institutions soft on banks and bondholders? Not necessarily.
The commission detests state aid. It wants the banks taken off life support as quickly as possible and where it has indicated a willingness to get tough with subordinated bondholders, its when state money is required to pay them. In a further effort to limit state subsidisation it demanded tough valuations on the toxic assets going into Nama. That’s good for the taxpayer, although it did create delays which aren’t helpful. It’s also demanding fundamental bank restructuring. The vibe is that the banks will be forced to shrink their business, possibly by selling off their foreign assets. That might get them off state aid quickly but won’t seem so great when we’re being hammered in charges to compensate for the lost income.
So, it’s a mixed bag. The EU insisted on bank rescue and may deliver punishment. Time will tell.
But I just can’t see the the point in exhorting the Irish citizenry to set up a petition or take to the streets.
Some days then, it seems like we have very few choices. In September we’ll find out if the Government wants to get tough, but we have other lines of enquiry to pursue. Recent analysis by academics Greg Connor, Tony Flavin and Brian O’Kelly confirms what we had suspected. The crisis could not have happened without regulatory negligence.
We still hold the power and obligation to demand accountability. Or vengeance. Call it what you will, but it is ours. If we don’t use the few powers we have left, what’s the point in having any?