Desmond Campbell, Nora Mills, Mary McNamara, Mary Mulvihill, John Noonan, Sean O'Sullivan, Sean Purcell, Thomas White, Johanna White, Thomas Daly and Philomena Coyne (plaintiffs) v The Minister for Agriculture, Food and Forestry, Ireland and The Attorney General (defendants).
EU Law - Council regulations - Commission regulations - Fairness of procedures - Legitimate expectations - Doctrine of excusable error - Whether Department of Agriculture under a duty to notify parties affected by passing of EU regulations - Whether time limits for granting milk quotas can be extended - Council Regulations Nos 857/84, 764/89, 163/91 - Commission Regulations Nos 1033/89, 2061/91.
The High Court (before Mr Justice Barron); judgment delivered 8 October 1997.
In deciding whether a plaintiff can successfully rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectation it is essential that the expectation is derived from something which occurred prior to the acts or events which it is alleged have breached those expectations. The legitimate expectation to which farmers who undertook to give up milk production for a limited period under European Union schemes were entitled was the right to resume milk production on the same basis as before, subject to any changes in the law during the period of their undertaking. Further, the time limits for applications under the milk quota regulations could not be extended. The High Court so held in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims.
James O'Reilly SC and Seamus Woulfe BL for the plaintiffs; Mary Finlay SC and Carroll Moran BL for the defendants.
Mr Justice Barron outlined the background to the case. The milk quota scheme adopted by the European Union was established by Council Regulation No 857/84. The quota allocated to dairy farmers depended on their production of milk in a particular year between 1981 and 1983. However, no provision was made for dairy farmers who, under EU schemes, undertook not to produce milk for periods of four or five years in return for a premium. These farmers were unable to obtain a quota as they had not produced any milk in the reference year. This position was successfully challenged before the Court of Justice in the case of Mulder [1988] ECR 2321. As a consequence the affected farmers were given a right to apply for milk quotas under Council Regulation 764/89 and Commission Regulation 1033/89 which became known as the Mulder One regulations.
However, two further problems arose in respect of the amended regulations. First, they did not provide for farmers whose undertakings had expired in the course of the reference year with the result that they were unable to produce milk for the whole or part of the reference year. Secondly, the regulations were interpreted not to include applicants who succeeded to holdings by inheritance or similar means after the expiry of the undertakings. These exclusions were also successfully challenged in the cases of Spagl [1990] ECR 4539 and Rauh [1991] ECR 1647. As a result the regulations were again amended by Council Regulation 163/91 and Commission Regulation 2061/91 which became known as the Mulder Two regulations. A three-month period from 1 July 1991 was determined as the period within which an application had to be made. All of the plaintiffs, with the exception of the ninth plaintiff, were persons who succeeded to their holdings by inheritance or similar means after the expiry of the relevant undertaking. The undertaking of the ninth plaintiff expired in the course of the reference year. All of the plaintiffs made applications under the Mulder One regulations which were refused and no applications were made by the plaintiffs under the Mulder Two regulations. In accordance with practice, the defendants gave notice of the passing of the Mulder One and Mulder Two regulations by placing notices in the national press and Iris Oifigiuil at the time of their passing. The defendants also issued press releases to ensure as wide a publication of the existence of the regulations as possible. None of the plaintiffs with the exception of the seventh plaintiff saw the notice. The plaintiffs contended that the manner and mode by which the first defendant attempted to notify the plaintiffs of the existence of the Mulder Two regulations was in breach of natural and constitutional justice and basic fairness of procedure. They submitted that as the Department of Agriculture was aware that the plaintiffs had all been refused quotas under the Mulder One regulations they should have been individually notified of the passing of the Mulder Two regulations. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were entitled to a special reference quantity as required under the regulations and, if necessary, an order extending the time within which an application might be made under the Mulder Two regulations.
Mr Justice Barron held that the legitimate expectation to which the farmers were entitled was the right to resume milk production at the end of the period of their undertaking. However, such right would be subject to any change of law during the period of that undertaking.
There was nothing in the way in which the Department of Agriculture acted which could have given any expectation to the plaintiffs that that what they claim should have been done in respect of the notification of the Mulder Two regulations would have been done. The fact that the defendants were aware of the rejection of the applications made under the Mulder One regulations, which rejection would not have been made had the Mulder Two regulations been in force, did not establish a legitimate expectation to be individually informed of the passing of these latter regulations.
Mr Justice Barron was also of the view that EU regulations become law in Ireland as from the date they came into force without any further act on the part of state officials. The notification procedures of the Department of Agriculture are a gratuitous undertaking but this has given rise to a legitimate expectation that matters of importance to the farming community will be advertised in such a way as to bring such matters to the attention of those affected.
The advertisement could and should have been clearer in pointing out that failure under the Mulder One regulations would not necessarily mean an application under the Mulder Two regulations would also fail. However, there was no duty on the Minister to set out any procedures other than article 3(a) of the regulations which related to the manner in which applications were to be made. This the minister did.
The plaintiffs also sought to have the Mulder Two time limit extended on the basis of the doctrine of excusable error which said doctrine allows for the restoration of the status quo ante when the conduct of the institution concerned gives rise to understandable confusion on the part of the affected parties. They claimed confusion arose from the failure of the defendants to adequately notify the plaintiffs that the refusals under the Mulder One regulations were in error. However, Mr Justice Barron held that there was no erroneous administrative practice in this case which would justify the application of the doctrine and in any event there was no general power entitling him to extend national time limits. It was also held that no declaration entitling the plaintiffs to a milk quota could be made since at best the plaintiffs could only claim a right to apply pursuant to regulations. No application was in fact made within the time set down in the regulations and the court could not extend that time. The seventh plaintiff was the only plaintiff who actually saw the advertisement and therefore the only one who could have been misled by it. Mr Justice Barron was satisfied that his entitlement to damages was dependent on whether his application would have been successful had it been made in time.
Solicitors: Oliver Ryan-Purcell (Emly) for the plaintiffs; Michael A Buckley (Dublin Castle) for the defendants.
