This week's exchange of words between the representatives of Michelle de Bruin and the people entrusted with policing her sport is likely, in retrospect, to have shed much more heat than light on the situation.

"There is nothing special in this case in comparison with other cases of the same kind," said Gunnar Werner, FINA's pathologically phlegmatic general secretary, yesterday. "The difference may be that the party here has been more aggressive than usual, probably not knowing the rules."

Whatever about the relative grasp of the rules by the various parties to the controversy it seems the wheels of sporting justice are trundling inexorably on.

Peter Lennon, the legal representative for Michelle de Bruin, was unavailable for comment yesterday, but was being widely quoted as contending that the FINA case was now null and void because FINA failed to test de Bruin's B sample for testosterone precursor.

Lennon told RTE that he now intends to seek an injunction preventing FINA from proceeding to the doping panel stage of the process.

Lennon has played his hand reasonably well thus far, conveying to the swimming authorities that he and his client will be dragged kicking and screaming through any process they wish to institute. He faces a difficulty however in relation to the testosterone precursor issue. FINA have never actually charged de Bruin with the use of the banned substance.

Testosterone precursor was mentioned in the laboratory report sent to de Bruin in late April, but FINA themselves have studiously avoided the issue in all statements and comments since the controversy broke. The first that journalists heard of the substance was when de Bruin told her press conference on April 29th that taking the substance was one of the things she was charged with.

FINA had merely notified the swimmer that they were undertaking a longitudinal analysis of various urine samples supplied by her, a practice which has become increasingly common in recent years as sporting bodies lay the groundwork for any legal challenges which could conceivably arise out of testosterone-related charges. The instigation of a longitudinal analysis is not a suggestion of guilt on the part of any athlete merely an attempt by scientists acting for the authorities to get a better idea of the levels of testosterone prevailing in the bodies of top competitors.

Whether or not the report on the B sample from the laboratory in Barcelona confirms the presence of testosterone precursor, FINA have good reason to be wary of getting into a legal tangle on the issue. Testosterone, its derivatives and its precursors have long been a minefield for sports bodies, particularly when dealing with female athletes, whose testosterone levels fluctuate.

The athlete Mary Decker Slaney was revealed to have an illegal testosterone: epitestosterone ratio in her body when tested at the US trials in Indianapolis in 1996. Subsequent longitudinal analysis revealed her to have a naturally fluctuating ratio and she was acquitted. Sports bodies have taken to doing the testing on athletes before problems arise.

Precursors are a slightly different area and represent virgin territory for swimming's authorities. The drugs designed to provoke the production of testosterone within the body are distinct from testosterone itself, but are a development with which science is just beginning to catch up. Most of the testing equipment and procedures for testosterone precursor detection are still awaiting approval from the International Olympic Committee.

Gunnar Werner, secretary of FINA, is nonplussed at present by the talk of testosterone precursors and injunctions. "We have followed the procedure in our rules. Our congress have accepted those procedures. As yet we have charged Ms de Bruin with nothing. We have forwarded her case to the doping panel. They will proceed."

In the meantime FINA have shied away from any mention so far of a testosterone precursor and have concentrated their arguments on the alleged tampering. It seems unlikely that de Bruin will, as her solicitor hoped yesterday, be able to get an injunction from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to stop FINA's process at this stage.

There are two types of case which the CAS is competent to hear. Its ordinary arbitration division deals with disputes arising from or related to contracts between sports bodies and third parties. Its appeal arbitration division deals with cases where judgment made by the disciplinary tribunal of a sports organisation (in this case FINA) is appealed.

All avenues of appeal within the sports organisation must first be exhausted and an appeal to the CAS must be made within 21 days of the party being informed of the decision of the disciplinary tribunal.

Matthieu Reeb, counsel for the CAS in Lausanne, feels that in cases where there is an arbitration agreement it is not possible for the court to issue an injunction or intervene at this stage.

"The Court of Arbitration for Sport would have jurisdiction only if there is an arbitration agreement referring to our tribunal and it is the case that a decision has been rendered prior to the appeal, a decision rendered by FINA. Then we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal."

That leaves de Bruin's legal team with the rather costlier option of entering the civil arena and seeking an interim remedy there.

Reeb feels that this avenue may offer the best prospects. "We must make a distinction between two possibilities. In the situation before a decision is rendered by the sports federation if there is an arbitration clause, then normally the civil courts have no jurisdiction at all, they should refuse to take up the case. In the event that there is a dispute before the decision is rendered and an athlete would like to have some interim measures, I think the civil court (in Switzerland) could have some jurisdiction. There is a possibility for this athlete to ask for preliminary methods (injunction) before the end of this procedure. At the end of that procedure they may still appeal to the Court of Arbitration."

To bypass the structures of the CAS and proceed straight to civil litigation in the Swiss courts is a costly process by comparison. The CAS requires a deposit of 500 Swiss francs, after that athletes just pay for their own counsel.

The acute difficulty for de Bruin and her team at this stage is that although FINA have not charged her with the use of a testosterone precursor, preferring not to be lured into that legal minefield, there is a mention of the substance in the laboratory report from Barcelona, thus suggesting a motive for the alleged tampering.

Together with the possibility that the testing officers in this case may have sent a report to their testing agency alleging irregularities when they left the de Bruin residence on January 10th, the options for the defence look increasingly limited.

The issue of a possible report from testers is a moot one. The International Doping Tests and Management (IDTM) officers are not required to fill in observations and reservations in the presence of the athlete being tested. The remarks space on the standard doping control form is for the athlete to fill out if they have objections to the process or parts thereof, and for the tester to respond in. Occasionally athletes make verbal comments which they refuse to write down. The tester will enter these on the remarks space.

Testing is a business in which relations between testers and tested are often fraught. Not too long ago a German tester was beaten up by Greek athletes whom he was attempting to test. There is no suggestion of anything but a cordial, businesslike relationship between the testers and athlete in this case, but any additional reports submitted will have a huge bearing on the outcome.

Regardless of what the testers may or may not have reported when they left Kells Grange House in January, after all the relevant documents are eventually forwarded to the CAS, if an appeal is the ultimate step after the FINA hearing, the words testosterone precursor will be on the laboratory report. The fight to clear the swimmer's name will accordingly be that much more difficult.

De Bruin is faced with the task of debunking the science and security of one of the most prestigious laboratories in the IOC-accredited list.

FINA rule DC8.1 is explicit as to where the burden of proof lies. It states: ". . . laboratories shall be presumed to have conducted custodial procedures in accordance with prevailing and acceptable standards of care. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary, but there shall be no burden on the laboratory in the first instance to establish its procedures."

The only comparable case of recent vintage again harks back to the celebrated case of Katrina Krabbe, the German runner who together with two compatriots was random tested in training in South Africa in 1991. The urine samples submitted by the three transpired to have come from the same person, a male.

Krabbe fought her case on the same basis that de Bruin is likely to have to fight hers, arguing that there was a breach in the chain of custody which allowed a party other than the athlete to interfere with the sample.

She could never prove this however and eventually got off on another technicality relating to the competence of the German athletics federation for conducting random tests outside their own jurisdiction. If the test had been carried out by her international federation, the IAAF, the case would have been lost.

The argument will continue to rage between Ireland and Lausanne.