Pool D/Ireland v Argentina:When your psychological, offensive, set-play and defensive systems show signs of failure you have what is called "a coaching train smash". Sadly we are watching one.

In every international team there are systems and the Ireland team is no different. The concept of having systems and making them function is all part of what being a coach is about. No matter what the Ireland coach does now, most of those systems have failed and serious reflection is required.

A head coach is like a fund manager. His systems are devised to add value to the product. Implementing systems within the framework of a squad is what a coach is hired to do. Systems within a World Cup are also vastly different to any other tournament and the management of those in the Ireland team have been very much found wanting in this tournament.

The systems can be broken down into pre-tournament, squad and in-tournament.

If you look at squad selection by Ireland going into this World Cup they did not bring an openside flanker in the mould of Johnny O'Connor or Keith Gleeson. The flankers brought were runners and that was part of the system. That attacking system places the backrowers on the flanks, not at the breakdown. This has not delivered an attacking system that is capable of breaking organised defences.

As such Ireland have not been able to score tries. Five tries plus one penalty try is a very poor outcome. To change this structure now is impossible because there are no openside flankers in the squad.

The non-selection of Eoin Reddan for any of the Six Nations matches earlier this year has also had a bearing on how this team is performing. Reddan made a number of decisive runs in the match against France but the team did not capitalise on these because his fellow players are not used to his game. He runs lines similar to George Gregan. He needs runners off him and they are not there. The pre-tournament selection system should have identified Reddan as a possible selection. This same system should have delivered Reddan into a game with O'Gara before the crunch game with France.

The pack's failure to provide the clean ball and go forward necessary to deliver space to a frustrated backline is the greatest in a host of problems. The failure of the selectors to deal with this glaring problem, while tinkering with the back line, is an example of denial.

The Rubicon of failure was actually crossed by the selectors after the first game. This was the failure to select a number of viable alternative players for the game against Georgia. Players such as Geordan Murphy, Alan Quinlan, Malcolm O'Kelly and Reddan should have been tried then. Their subsequent selection or non-selection only reinforces the idea that the team is selected on reaction not fact or knowledge.

This led to more physical and mental pressure being placed on the starting players and an increase in frustration among the players who were not starting. The journey of Murphy's selection saga from the bench to non-selection to starting against Argentina without having played any significant rugby further displays a lack of evaluation on actual performance. Rather it's a perception of performance as a selection policy.

Another of the systems found wanting was the Ireland defence. The holes are too vast to explain in this column. But when Namibia and Georgia exploited the holes behind our wings, it was a sure thing that France would definitely do it better, and they did.

The dropping of Andrew Trimble illustrates a policy that was doomed because it was flawed. To defend a scrum 20 metres from your try line and 15 metres from touch and to leave the blindside unattended as a matter of policy, in order to place pressure on Freddy Michalak, beggars belief.

Claims that France somehow knew the Ireland calling system is another example of a lack of real evaluation. Malcolm O'Kelly was needed here at the start, or injected earlier than he was. The staff seemed frozen to act. To explain it away by saying it is conservatism is simply hiding. When O'Kelly came on the lineouts were won.

The scrum was heroic and manful for an hour but became exhausted, especially when Paul O'Connell was sent to the sinbin. But late in the game players were spent. The bench was required.

When O'Connell was off Ireland had no policy of how to play the match with just 14 men. What they needed to do was slow the game down and move to set-plays. Hold on to the ball for their lives. What we saw was Ronan O'Gara chip-kicking in his own 22 and subsequently a turnover of possession.

There was also slight panic from our key decision-makers. System failure. Any thorough evaluation of the lineout, starting players, tactics and use of the bench would indicate that they need a radical overhaul.

In a major tournament I have never seen a leading international team performing so far below their collective capabilities. Much has been invested in this team and win, lose or draw on Sunday major changes on the field, in pre-tournament, during the tournament and in evaluation systems ares urgently required.

For this team to perform at the level of mediocrity that we have witnessed is quite unprecedented.

Talk of Lions tours and staff remaining unchanged needs to be shelved. Deep and thorough evaluations of all areas of coaching and systems and structures needs to be established.

But there is no evidence that this will occur.

Finally Stephen Covey, author of Principled Centered Leadership, once said: "You cannot talk your way out of a situation you have acted your way into."