The cliche about a match being won on the pitch, not on the sideline, remains true. But only just. In the heat of battle - especially with the Sam Maguire at stake - and the advent of five substitutes raising the tactical requirements, cool heads on the line are a requisite, a fact which was clearly demonstrated in the drawn final two Sundays ago.

Most management teams will play down their role, preferring to emphasise that players win, lose or draw matches. Yet, the first game between Galway and Kerry showed that decisions made on the line, and the timing of such, can fundamentally affect a game.

In that regard, observers agree that Galway's backroom team - manager John O'Mahony and selectors Peter Warren and Steven Joyce - generally got it right in the switches made in the course of the game and, consequently, emerged with most kudos.

That was then. Today? Another game, another day, it could be a different story. Maybe Paidi O Se and selectors John O'Keeffe, Jack O'Connor, Eddie O'Sullivan and Eamon Walsh will prove wiser. Intriguingly, as in the first match, the question of when to play Maurice Fitzgerald, and where, is one that immediately torments them . . . and one that invariably determines whether they have won the sideline battle of wits.

Throwing on Fitzgerald the last day didn't work out, but it had on the previous four occasions this year when he'd been used as a substitute. Indeed, Joe Reynolds, manager of the Leitrim team, believes that Kerry's management will be more pro-active this time out.

"They had a negative approach the first day and have suffered some criticism for that. As a result, I think they'll be very active and a lot quicker to move people," he said.

In the original match, there were a number of sideline decisions which influenced the outcome. It could be argued that Galway, in their precarious position early in the game, didn't have much alternative other than to be positive in their decision-making. But the men on the line had the resolve to act, and very nearly didn't need a second chance.

The first Galway sideline move involved the introduction of Kevin Walsh. With the game by-passing Joe Bergin and slipping away from Galway's grasp, Walsh was thrown into the fray.

"Kerry were owning the middle of the field, it was where all of Galway's problems were stemming from," says Down's All-Ireland winning manager, Peter McGrath. "When you have someone like Walsh available, you put him on. The timing of his introduction, though, before half-time, was correct. It halted Kerry's monopoly."

Not long afterwards, Galway's sideline made another decisive move. Padraig Joyce was moved from full forward to centre forward and, in the reshuffle, Tommy Joyce moved to wing forward and Paul Clancy in to full forward. Again, it was a move that reaped dividends, mainly in the way it upset a Kerry defence that had previously been on top.

There have been suggestions that Kerry's selectors fell down by not sending Seamus Moynihan out to follow Padraig Joyce. But both Reynolds and McGrath believe they were right to leave him at full back.

"They had no ready-made replacement for that position," says Reynolds, while McGrath insists: "Moynihan's performances there have saved Kerry this year, especially the two games with Armagh. He's saved their bacon so often that the risk in moving him was simply too great."

Galway's backroom team's next move, early in the second half, involved a defensive change: Ray Silke, who had started off by marking Michael Francis Russell before being moved to the other corner to make John Crowley, was replaced by Richie Fahy. Should Galway have taken Silke off earlier?

"No, again I think the timing was right," says McGrath. "We all know what Silke has done and is capable of doing. We know what dynamism and heart he gives a team. To take him off earlier would have been premature and, under the circumstances, I think they got the balance just right."

Fahy's introduction, nevertheless, went down as another constructive move by the Galway selectors.

The fourth significant move involved bringing on John Donnellan into the attack. Although he was dispossessed for Dara O Cinneide's point, it proved another positive move in the overall scheme of things. "I expected they would use him at some stage," says Reynolds. "In much the same way as Colin Corkery caused Kerry problems, John Donnellan's physical presence, with the high ball in, allowed Galway to maintain momentum."

By contrast, Kerry's failure to react to many of Galway's moves - or be pro-active themselves - left them open to criticism. There was no change to centrefield to counteract Walsh's influence. And, then, when Fitzgerald was finally introduced, it was into a corner forward position - where he is least effective - in place of a player, John Crowley, who was playing well.

Was Fitzgerald an option for centrefield (as was the case against Cork in Killarney)? "I don't think so," says McGrath, "because he wasn't 100 per cent right . . . but he's not too far away."

Reynolds, meanwhile, believes that the decision to take off Crowley who was "sharp and dangerous" was "a mistake". However, he is also of the opinion that a place should be found for Fitzgerald. "When the pressure is on, there is no way a player of his talent should be left on the line," says Reynolds.

Indeed, there is also an argument emanating from Kerry that, even when they were romping away with the match early on, Fitzgerald would have broken down the Galway defence even more because of the type of ball he'd have been able to deliver to a rampant Russell. So, it seems, even when a team is capable of opening up a seven-point gap, it is not sufficient to please some people. Who'd be a selector?

McGrath, though, makes the interesting observation that the five substitutes rule has changed the face of the game. Managers now are planning changes and are in a position to think out a lot more moves.

"Under the old system, you'd get to use one or two substitutes and then the third one was a last-ditch effort. With five subs, managers get to make the best possible use of resources. It's a lot more tactical, and now the fifth substitute is the last-ditch one, just as the third one used to be."

All of which has enabled managers to utilise their squads to a greater extent, but which has also placed them under a more glaring spotlight when things go wrong.