2006 Ryder Cup: Philip Reid on how the week's unfolding dramas impinged on the reputations of the two captains.

Just about a month ago, Tom Lehman arrived at The K Club on a reconnaissance trip that seemed like the captaincy coup of all time. With him, he had all 12 members of his Ryder Cup team, including Tiger Woods and Phil Mickelson, who had changed personal and business commitments.

It seemed he was a new-age captain for America, one capable of regaining the old order. He was a superb communicator, both with his team - going so far as to write personal letters to potential members earlier this year - and the media. He was suave and eloquent. He cut an imposing figure.

Later that same week, in Munich, Ian Woosnam, the European captain, was denigrated by Thomas Bjorn, a player he had overlooked for a captain's pick. Bjorn had heard of his omission only when it was announced on television. Woosie hadn't been able to tell the Dane he had opted to pick Lee Westwood.

"There are a lot of people feeling uneasy about the Woosie captaincy. Stories will start to come out . . ." claimed Bjorn.

The images of the respective captains before the 36th Ryder Cup could hardly have been more contrasting. Yet, on Sunday, after the fact, the images had swapped around completely where it mattered most: in what it took to get their teams to play and to win.

Woosnam may not have been a match for Lehman when a microphone was shoved in front of him, but he was better in how he handled team pairings, better when it came to encouraging his players, better when it came to getting them to win.

Some observers claim the role of captain is exaggerated, that it is the players ultimately who win or lose the Ryder Cup. The truth is players do win it. It is up to them to pull off the shots that matter once they're thrown into the white-hot fray that is the Ryder Cup. But captains are vitally important too, and it was apparent from early on last week, in the practice days, that Woosnam had a handle on things.

For example, on Wednesday morning when dreadful weather bombarded the course, Woosnam put it to his players that he understood if they didn't want to play, but also gently pointed out that a lot of people had paid a lot of money for tickets to watch them. The players took a unanimous decision to play, albeit for only nine holes.

In contrast, the Americans, who opted to play nine holes later in the day, made the first poor public-relations move of their visit. Although they decided to play, it was by walking halfway up the fairway and playing only short-iron approaches to the greens and then putting.

Lehman realised the faux pas only when the jeers of the crowds who had gathered in the grandstands patiently waiting for the arrival of the US team wafted down the fairway. But they persisted with the format. It was only afterwards that Lehman put his hands up and took responsibility for the gaffe.

When the more important part of the week came about, Woosnam continued to win. By the Friday night, Woosnam had used all 12 players from his team and saw his side take a 5-3 lead. He even had the firmness of conviction to leave three players ranked inside the top 14 in the world - Luke Donald, David Howell and Henrik Stenson - out of that first morning's foursomes.

Lehman, who had decided on his opening foursomes pairings two weeks before the match, stuck to Plan A. He pumped up the importance of the opening fourballs match, which the US won, claiming it would set down a vital marker for the rest of the competition.

Woosnam, who had decided on his pairings only after watching how players performed in practice, offered the opinion that it was just one of 24 points available over the three days. His boys lost the first foursomes, but he was right: there were other points to chase.

"When you've got great players, it makes your job easy. It was difficult to come in here with a game plan. I had to see how the guys were playing at the time. But I did think this course was a very long course, and it demanded length off the tee. And I used that, and I think it's worked out successfully," Woosnam was to remark on Sunday after the 18½ to 9½ win.

Everything Woosnam touched turned to gold. When he needed someone to sit down in the foursomes, Darren Clarke offered and Woosnam accepted. He was able to mix and match partnerships, having full belief in his team.

Lehman didn't have the same belief, even going so far as to upset Scott Verplank, who had believed he would play in Saturday's afternoon session of fourballs, by picking Zach Johnson in his place.

Nobody can doubt Lehman's desire to win. He had prepared meticulously, doing all that seemed right in the build-up to the match. The simple fact is the strength of the United States team does not match that of the European team. While the US have the top three players in the world rankings, Europe have eight players in the world's top-20 while the US have only five.

Europe's record-equalling win, coming just two years after the victory in Oakland Hills by the same margin, could lead to further changes in the American qualifying system, something that Lehman outlined: "I think when you've lost again you need to sit down and think about everything and figure out the entire Ryder Cup universe and figure out is there something we can do better."

Tactically, Woosnam won the Ryder Cup battle of wills over Lehman. On the course, the European players followed his lead. It was a remarkable statistic that no fewer than six Europeans - Westwood, Clarke, Donald, Olazabal, Casey and Howell - were unbeaten, with just one, Verplank, managing to do the same for the US.

That statistic, more than any, is a sign of the times; a sign of Europe's dominance.