The blame game continues over responsibility for the October 7th, 2023, Hamas attack on southern Israel which, Israeli tallies say, left 1,200 people dead and 251 kidnapped to Gaza.
It was the worst moment in Israel’s history and the trauma may never be fully erased. Fifty-nine hostages remain in Gaza and with efforts to bring about their release deadlocked, a resumption of the Israel-Hamas war remains a distinct possibility.
On Tuesday, the Israel Security Agency (ISA) Shin Bet released a detailed report outlining its role in the security failure. It was a damning self-indictment.
The renowned intelligence body admitted it had failed to correctly interpret numerous indications that Hamas was planning the attack and had failed to warn the military and political leadership. But the ISA also pointed the finger of blame at Israel’s leadership.
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The report cited policies that were enacted by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu over more than a decade as contributing factors to the failure: “A policy of quiet that allowed Hamas’s massive build-up; the flow of Qatari funds and their delivery to Hamas’s military wing; the ongoing erosion of Israeli deterrence; the effort to cope with a terrorist organisation on the basis of intelligence and defence, while refraining from offensive initiative; the cumulative weight of violations on the Temple Mount, the treatment of [Palestinian] prisoners and the perception that Israeli society had been weakened because of the damage to social cohesion.”
The response from Netanyahu’s close circle was immediate: ISA director Ronen Bar needed to resign immediately. A statement, broadly reported by Israeli media outlets, accused him of having “failed completely in everything that pertains to how the Shin Bet coped with the Hamas organisation in general and specifically to the event of October 7″.
The unnamed authors of the statement also asserted that the ISA failures had kept Netanyahu in the dark.
It accused Bar of failing to “read the intelligence picture correctly” and of being a “slave to the preconception [that Hamas was deterred and did not seek conflict]. In routine intelligence assessments, including a few days before the massacre, the chief thesis in the ISA was that Hamas wanted to maintain the quiet and that there would not be a war”.
Specifically, Bar was criticised for deciding not to contact Netanyahu in the early hours of October 7th, 2023, when worrying signs were being picked up from Gaza, including Hamas fighters inserting Israeli Sim cards into their phones.
Bar is resisting the pressure to resign, arguing he needs to stay in his role until all the hostages return home.
A lot is said about responsibility, but the significance is in the eye of the beholder
— Lt Gen Herzi Halevi, former head of Israel's defence forces
Tuesday’s report followed a number of reports from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in recent weeks in which military chiefs also admitted their responsibility for the October 7th security failure.
On Wednesday the army’s top general, Lt Gen Herzi Halevi, stepped down. “This happened on my watch. What happened is my responsibility. And I bear this and will always bear it. In the name of responsibility, I am ending my term. A lot is said about responsibility, but the significance is in the eye of the beholder,” he said, looking at the table where Netanyahu was sitting.
The ISA report essentially argued that without a comprehensive external investigation it will be impossible to investigate fully the reasons that brought about the Hamas attack.
But Netanyahu continues to resist the establishment of a state commission of inquiry in the hope that the responsibility will stick with the IDF and the ISA.
